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The FCPA’s Record-Breaking Year
MIKE KOEHLER
On a number of levels, 2016 was a record-breaking year for Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act enforcement. This article, part of annual series, highlights how 2016 
witnessed the largest number of corporate enforcement action and largest 
aggregate corporate settlement amounts in the FCPA’s nearly 40 year history.
FCPA enforcement in 2016 was also notable given the wide spectrum of 
enforcement actions. For instance, there were FCPA enforcement actions against 
U.S. companies as well as foreign companies; enforcement actions that alleged 
egregious instances of corporate bribery executed at the highest levels of a company 
as well as enforcement actions finding bribery based on allegations of “golf in the 
morning and beer-drinking in the evening” and internship and hiring practices; 
enforcement actions against large multinational companies as well as small 
publicly-traded companies, privately-held companies and limited liability 
companies; enforcement actions across a wide spectrum of industries such as 
technology, oil and gas, pharmaceutical and medical device, airlines, and financial 
services; and enforcement actions involving conduct across the globe from Latin 
America to South America, to Eastern Europe to Africa with a majority of 
enforcement actions focusing in whole or in part on conduct occurring in China.
2016 was notable not just for record-breaking and diverse enforcement activity 
often tied to expansive and evolving enforcement theories, but also FCPA policy 
developments. For instance, both the Department of Justice and Securities and 
Exchange Commission renewed their long-standing FCPA enforcement 
commitment and the DOJ released a one year FCPA Pilot Program designed in 
large part to further motivate business organizations to voluntarily disclose FCPA 
issues to better facilitate enforcement actions against culpable individuals.
In short, much happened in the FCPA space in 2016 and this article provides 
a detailed analysis of the most notable FCPA enforcement and policy developments 
and will be value to anyone seeking to elevate their FCPA knowledge.
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The FCPA’s Record-Breaking Year
MIKE KOEHLER *
INTRODUCTION
On a number of levels, 2016 was a record-breaking year for Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act enforcement. This article, part of an annual series, 
highlights how 2016 witnessed the largest number of corporate enforcement 
actions and largest aggregate corporate settlement amounts in the FCPA’s 
nearly forty-year history. 
FCPA enforcement in 2016 was also notable given the wide spectrum 
of enforcement actions. For instance, there were FCPA enforcement actions 
against U.S. companies as well as foreign companies; enforcement actions 
that alleged egregious instances of corporate bribery executed at the highest 
levels of a company, as well as enforcement actions finding bribery based 
on allegations of “golf in the morning and beer-drinking in the evening,” and 
internship and hiring practices; enforcement actions against large 
multinational companies, as well as small publicly traded companies, 
privately held companies, and limited liability companies; enforcement 
actions across a wide spectrum of industries such as technology, oil and gas, 
pharmaceutical and medical device, airlines, and financial services; and 
                                                                                                                         
* Mike Koehler is an Associate Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law. Professor 
Koehler is the founder and editor of the award-winning website FCPA Professor 
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com) and author of the book “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in a New 
Era” (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014). Professor Koehler’s FCPA expertise and views are informed by 
a decade of legal practice experience at a leading international law firm. The issues covered in this article, 
current as of January 1, 2017, assume the reader has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the 
FCPA, as well as FCPA enforcement, including the role of the Department of Justice and Securities and 
Exchange Commission in enforcing the FCPA, and the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve 
FCPA scrutiny.  Interested readers can learn more about these topics and others by reading the author’s 
FCPA Professor website; specifically, the FCPA 101 page of the site 
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101).  
This article is part of a continuing series of yearly analysis by the author of FCPA enforcement and 
related issues. For 2015, see Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Statistics, Theories, Policies, 
and Beyond, __ CLEV. ST. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017). For 2014, see Mike Koehler, A Snapshot of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 143 (2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584661. For 2013, see Mike Koehler, A Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 961 (2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2428555. For 2012, see Mike Koehler, An 
Examination of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Issues, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 317 (2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2298644. For 2011, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1 (2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191149. For 2010, see Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, 
and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99 (2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1971021. For 2009, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389 (2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1599725.
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enforcement actions involving conduct across the globe from Latin America 
to South America, to Eastern Europe to Africa, with a majority of 
enforcement actions focusing in whole or in part on conduct occurring in 
China.
The year 2016 was notable not just for record-breaking and diverse 
enforcement activity often tied to expansive and evolving enforcement 
theories, but also FCPA policy developments. For instance, both the 
Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission renewed 
their long-standing FCPA enforcement commitment, and the DOJ released 
a one-year FCPA Pilot Program designed in large part to further motivate 
business organizations to voluntarily disclose FCPA issues to better 
facilitate enforcement actions against culpable individuals.
In short, much happened in the FCPA space in 2016 and this article 
provides a detailed analysis of the most notable FCPA enforcement and 
policy developments and will be value to anyone seeking to elevate their 
FCPA knowledge.
I. 2016 FCPA ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS AND HISTORICAL 
COMPARISONS
On a number of levels, 2016 was a record-breaking year for FCPA 
enforcement. While it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed 
overview of each enforcement action, this section highlights certain 
quantitative and qualitative statistics from 2016, as well as historical 
comparisons, in the following ways: corporate DOJ enforcement actions; 
corporate SEC enforcement actions; aggregate corporate enforcement 
actions; and individual DOJ and SEC enforcement actions. In doing so, the 
following salient points will be highlighted: (i) the continued prominence of 
NPAs and DPAs1 and other alternative resolution vehicles to resolve 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions; and (ii) the continued gap between 
corporate enforcement actions and related individual prosecutions of 
company employees.
                                                                                                                         
1 DPA refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NPA refers to a non-prosecution agreement. 
To learn more about DPAs and NPAs in the FCPA context, see Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA 
Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705517. Declinations with disgorgement are discussed in more detail in 
Section II of this article. See infra, Section II.
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A. Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions
As demonstrated in Table I, in thirteen corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions2 in 2016, the DOJ collected approximately $1.2 billion in net 
settlement amounts.
Table I - 2016 DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company
(Industry)
Settle-
-ment 
Amount3
Resolution 
Vehicle
Origin4 Related 
Indiv-
-idual 
Action5
PTC6
(Technology)
$14.5 
million
NPA Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
Unitel (VimpelCom)7
(Telecommunication)
$230.1 
million8
Plea / DPA9 Unclear No
Olympus Latin $22.8 DPA Unclear No
                                                                                                                         
2 Corporate FCPA enforcement statistics in this article use the “core” approach. The core approach 
focuses on unique instances of corporate conduct regardless of whether the conduct at issue involved a 
DOJ or SEC enforcement action, or both (as is frequently the case); regardless of whether the corporate 
enforcement action involved a parent company, a subsidiary, or both (as is frequently the case); and 
regardless of whether the DOJ and/or SEC brought any related individual enforcement action (as is 
occasionally the case). For additional information on this method of quantifying FCPA enforcement, see 
What is an FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action. This method of computing FCPA
statistics is consistent with the DOJ’s approach. See Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-72 (quoting DOJ’s FCPA Unit Chief). Further, it is a 
commonly accepted method used by other scholars in other areas. See, e.g., Michael Klausner & Jason 
Hegland, SEC Practice in Targeting and Penalizing Individual Defendants, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/03/sec-
practice-in-targeting-and-penalizing-individual-defendants/ (discussing how the SEC names and 
penalizes defendants believed to have engaged in misconduct).
3 Historically, the settlement amount in a DOJ FCPA enforcement action was always a criminal 
fine amount. However, in the HMT and NCH matters (announced on the same day), the DOJ invented a 
new way to bring an FCPA enforcement action, a so-called “declination with disgorgement” pursuant to 
which the company agreed to pay a disgorgement amount. This new form of resolving corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions is discussed in more detail in Section II of this article. Infra, Section II. 
4 Refers to the event or events that initially prompted the scrutiny that resulted in the FCPA 
enforcement action. See Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22.3 MICH. ST. INT’L
L. REV. 961, 965, 973 (including further information about events initially prompting the scrutiny).
5 Refers to employees of the corporate entity resolving the FCPA enforcement action. Id. at 965, 
970–71 n.29, 988. 
6 Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice including a Non-Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 16, 
2016), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PTC-NPA.pdf.
7 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, VimpelCom Limited and Unitel LLC 
Enter into Global Foreign Bribery Resolution of more than $795 Million (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/vimpelcom-limited-and-unitel-llc-enter-global-foreign-bribery-
resolution-more-795-million.
8 Id. (value is for numerical calculation after accounting for various credits and deductions). 
9 Id. The enforcement action involved criminal information against Unitel LLC resolved via a plea 
agreement, and criminal information against VimpelCom resolved via a DPA. Id.
96 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
America10
(Medical Device)
million
BK Medical 
(Analogic)11
(Medical Device)
$3.4 
million
NPA Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
LAN / LATAM 
Airlines12
(Airline)
$12.75 
million
DPA Foreign 
Media 
Reports
No
Och-Ziff13
(Financial Services)
$213
million
Plea /DPA14 DOJ/SEC 
Information 
Requests15
No
HMT LLC16
(Oil and Gas)
$335,000 Declination with 
Disgorgement
Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
NCH17
(Maintenance)
$2.7 
million
Declination with 
Disgorgement 
Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
Embraer18
(Airline)
$107.3 
million
DPA DOJ/SEC 
Information 
No
                                                                                                                         
10 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Medical Equipment Company will 
Pay $646 Million for Making Illegal Payments to Doctors and Hospitals in United States and Latin 
America (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/medical-equipment-company-will-pay-646-
million-making-illegal-payments-doctors-and-hospitals.
11 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Analogic Subsidiary Agrees to Pay 
More than $14 Million to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Jun. 21, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/analogic-subsidiary-agrees-pay-more-14-million-resolve-foreign-
bribery-charges.
12 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, LATAM Airlines Group Resolves 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $12.75 Million Criminal Penalty (Jul. 25 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/latam-airlines-group-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-
investigation-and-agrees-pay-1275.
13 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Och-Ziff Capital Management 
Admits to Role in Africa Bribery Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal Fine (Sept. 29, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/och-ziff-capital-management-admits-role-africa-bribery-
conspiracies-and-agrees-pay-213.
14 Id. (the enforcement action involved a criminal information against OZ Africa Management GP 
LLC resolved via a plea agreement, and a criminal information against Och-Ziff Capital Management 
resolved via a DPA). 
15 See Shareholders Foundation Inc., Update in Lawsuit for Investors in Och Ziff Capital 
Management Group LLC (NYSE:OZM) Shares Announced by Shareholders Foundation, NASDAQ 
GLOBENEWSWIRE (May 10, 2016, 9:45 PM), https://globenewswire.com/news-
release/2016/05/10/838385/0/en/Update-in-Lawsuit-for-Investors-in-Och-Ziff-Capital-Management-
Group-LLC-NYSE-OZM-shares-announced-by-Shareholders-Foundation.html (explaining that the 
company previously disclosed, “[b]eginning in 2011, and from time to time thereafter, we have received 
subpoenas from the SEC and requests for information from the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) 
in connection with an investigation involving the FCPA and related laws”).
16 Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, closing the investigation of NCH 
Corporation (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/899121/download.
17 See id. (further explaining NCH).
18 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Embraer Agrees to Pay More Than 
$107 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/embraer-agrees-pay-more-107-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt-
practices-act-charges.
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Requests19
JPMorgan Securities 
(Asia Pacific) 
(JPMorgan)20
(Financial Services)
$72
million
NPA SEC 
Information 
Request21
No
Odebrecht / Braskem22
(Construction / 
Petrochemical)
$252
million23
Plea / Plea Foreign Law 
Enforcement 
Investigation
No
Teva Pharmaceutical24
(Pharmaceutical)
$283
million
Plea / DPA SEC 
Information 
Request / 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
No
General Cable25
(Wire & Cable)
$20.5 
million
NPA Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
TOTAL $1.2
billion
                                                                                                                         
19 In previous SEC filings, Embraer stated: “In September, 2010, we received a subpoena from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, and associated inquiries from the U.S. Department of 
Justice, or DOJ, concerning possible non-compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or 
FCPA, in relation to certain aircraft sales outside of Brazil.” Embraer S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 
12 (Mar. 29, 2016); Embraer S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 12 (Mar. 27, 2015).
20 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, JPMorgan’s Investment Bank in 
Hong Kong Agrees to Pay $72 Million Penalty for Corrupt Hiring Scheme in China (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jpmorgan-s-investment-bank-hong-kong-agrees-pay-72-million-
penalty-corrupt-hiring-scheme.
21 See JPMorgan Hiring in China Under U.S. Scrutiny - Report, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2013, 10:56 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/jpmorgan-investigation-china-idUSL2N0GJ01F20130818 (stating 
that the company in an SEC filing had stated that it received “a request from the SEC Division of 
Enforcement seeking information and documents relating to, among other matters, the firm’s 
employment of certain former employees in Hong Kong and its business relationships with certain 
clients”).
22 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Odebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty 
and Agree to Pay at Least $3.5 Billion in Global Penalties (Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billion-
global-penalties-resolve.
23 Braskem agreed to pay the United States $94.8 million in criminal penalties and $65 million in 
disgorgement. See id. (“Braskem agreed to pay a total criminal penalty of $632 million . . . [of which] 
[t]he United States will receive $94.8 million . . . .”); Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n,
Petrochemical Manufacturer Braskem S.A. to Pay $957 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-271.html (“Braskem agreed to pay $325 million in 
disgorgement, including $65 million to the SEC . . . .”). Odebrecht agreed to a (reduced) penalty of $93 
million. Sentencing Memorandum at 4, United States v. Odebrecht S.A., No. 16-643 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 11, 2017).
24 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. 
Agrees to Pay More Than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec. 22, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-
million-resolve-foreign-corrupt.
25 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, General Cable Corporation Agrees 
to Pay $20 Million Penalty for Foreign Bribery Schemes in Asia and Africa (Dec. 29, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/general-cable-corporation-agrees-pay-20-million-penalty-foreign-
bribery-schemes-asia-and.
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As highlighted in Tables II and III below, in 2016 DOJ corporate FCPA 
enforcement—measured both in terms of the number of core actions and 
aggregate settlement amounts—was significantly higher than historical 
averages, indeed record-setting in terms of the largest yearly DOJ settlement 
amounts.
Table II - Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2016)
Year Core Actions
2016 13
2015 2
2014 7
2013 7
2012 9
2011 11
2010 17
Table III – Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement 
Amounts (2010 – 2016)
Year Settlement Amounts
2016 $1.2 billion
2015 $24.2 million
2014 $1.25 billion
2013 $420 million
2012 $142 million
2011 $355 million
2010 $870 million
Even though DOJ FCPA enforcement in 2016 was record-setting, few 
meaningful big-picture conclusions should be drawn. 
For starters, year-to-year FCPA enforcement statistics, and the arbitrary 
cutoffs associated with them, are of marginal value given that many non-
substantive factors can influence the timing of an actual corporate FCPA 
enforcement action.26 Moreover, and as highlighted in more detail in Table 
                                                                                                                         
26 Because FCPA enforcement actions that involve both a DOJ and SEC component are typically 
announced on the same day, and because the DOJ and SEC are separate enforcement agencies, it is
common for FCPA enforcement actions to be delayed while one agency waits for the other to finish its 
investigation of the conduct at issue and its negotiation of a resolution with a company. Although far 
from an exclusive list, additional non-substantive factors that can influence the timing of an FCPA 
enforcement action include DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee departures or leaves), as 
well as securing corporate board approval for resolving an FCPA enforcement action.
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VII below, FCPA enforcement statistics in most years are impacted by a few 
unique events and often one or a small group of enforcement actions 
significantly skew enforcement statistics.27
Nevertheless, two DOJ FCPA enforcement statistics from 2016 are 
worthy of further exploration: (i) the continued prominence of NPAs and 
DPAs and other alternative resolution vehicles to resolve corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions; and (ii) the continued lack of related individual DOJ 
prosecutions in connection with corporate enforcement actions.
The first notable statistic is that twelve of the thirteen (92%) corporate 
enforcement actions (all but Odebrecht / Braskem) were resolved either 
through an NPA, DPA, or a so-called declination with disgorgement—a new 
method the DOJ invented in 2016 to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions.28 This is consistent with the trend in the FCPA’s modern era of the 
DOJ resolving corporate FCPA enforcement actions through such 
controversial resolution vehicles.29 Indeed, since 2010 approximately 85% 
of corporate DOJ enforcement actions have involved alternative resolution 
vehicles.30
The second notable statistic is that none of the 2016 corporate 
enforcement actions have (at least yet) resulted in any related DOJ charges 
against company employees. This statistic, while troubling, is not a 
significant anomaly given that approximately 80% of DOJ corporate 
enforcement actions since 2006 have not resulted in any related DOJ charges 
against company employees.31 However, this statistic was more notable in 
2016 compared to prior years given the DOJ’s release in late 2015 of a policy 
memo titled “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing.” In the 
so-called Yates Memo, the DOJ stated:
One of the most effective ways to combat corporate 
misconduct is by seeking accountability from the individuals 
who perpetrated the wrongdoing. Such accountability is 
                                                                                                                         
27 Id. For instance, in 2017 there is likely to be an approximately $900 million enforcement action 
that alone will eclipse total FCPA settlement amounts in several prior years. See The Burgeoning 
Uzbekistan Telecommunication Investigations, FCPA Professor (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-burgeoning-uzbekistan-telecommunication-investigations.
28 See Mike Koehler, DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA – 2016 Year In Review, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-fcpa-2016-year-review/ (containing links to 
statistics for prior years).
29 To learn more about NPAs and DPAs, including why such alternative resolution vehicles are 
controversial, see Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 910–924 
(2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705517; Mike Koehler, Measuring the 
Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 499, 528–29 (2015); Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Narrative, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 961, 978–
87 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2428555.
30 To determine each action’s resolution vehicle, see SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, infra note 75, and view the “related documents” under each case.
31 Id.
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important for several reasons: it deters future illegal activity, 
it incentivizes changes in corporate behavior, it ensures that 
the proper parties are held responsible for their actions, and it 
promotes the public’s confidence in our justice system.32
In subsequent public comments, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates 
stated, that towards the above objectives, “[t]he revised factors [in the Yates 
Memo] now emphasize the primacy in any corporate case of holding 
individual wrongdoers accountable and list a variety of steps that 
prosecutors are expected to take to maximize the opportunity to achieve that 
goal.”33 Specifically in the FCPA context, Yates stated:
[W]e cannot forget that behind every bribe and illegal payment 
is one or more individuals who knew what they were doing 
was wrong and nonetheless broke the law. . . . [W]e must do 
our best to ensure that whoever is responsible is held 
accountable. . . . [T]he best way to deter individual conduct is 
the threat of going to jail.  That’s what truly changes behavior. 
That’s what changes the calculus as employees and executives 
decide whether to participate in an illegal scheme.34
Additionally, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell stated that 
“certainly . . . there has been an increased emphasis on, let’s get some 
individuals” and that it is “very important for [the DOJ] to hold accountable 
individuals who engage in criminal misconduct in white-collar (cases), as 
we do in every other kind of crime,” and DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Patrick 
Stokes stated that the DOJ is “very focused” on prosecuting individuals as 
well as companies and that “going after one or the other is not sufficient for 
deterrence purposes.”35
Yet, similar to prior years, actual statistics prove how hollow the DOJ’s 
rhetoric is when it comes to holding individuals accountable for conduct 
giving rise to corporate FCPA enforcement actions.
                                                                                                                         
32 Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General on 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download.
33 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Deputy Attorney General Sally 
Quillian Yates Delivers Remarks at American Banking Association and American Bar Association 
Money Laundering Enforcement Convergence (Nov. 16, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-
american-banking-0.
34 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. 
Yates Delivers Remarks at the 33rd Annual International Conference on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-
remarks-33rd-annual-international.
35 Mike Koehler, A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 26, 2017) 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/focus-doj-individual-actions/.
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B. Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions
As demonstrated in Table IV, in twenty-four corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions in 2016 the SEC collected approximately $1.07 billion 
in settlement amounts.
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Table IV - 2016 SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company
(Industry)
Settlement 
Amount
Resolution 
Vehicle
Origin Related 
Individual 
Action
SAP36
(Technology)
$3.9 
million
Admin. 
Action
SEC
Investigation37
Yes
SciClone 
Pharmaceuticals38
(Pharmaceutical)
$12.8 
million
Admin. 
Action
SEC
Investigation
No
PTC39
(Technology)
$13.7 
million
Admin. 
Action
Voluntary 
Disclosure
Yes
VimeplCom40
(Telecommunications)
$167.5 
million41
Settled 
Civil 
Complaint
Unclear No
Qualcomm42
(Technology)
$7.5 
million
Admin. 
Action
DOJ/SEC 
Investigation43
No
Nordion44 $375,000 Admin. Voluntary Yes
                                                                                                                         
36 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Software Company With FCPA 
Violations (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-17.html.
37 See id. (“An SEC investigation found that SAP’s deficient internal controls allowed a former 
SAP executive to pay $145,000 in bribes to a senior Panamanian government official and offer bribes to 
two others in exchange for lucrative sales contracts.”).
38 For more information on SciClone Pharmaceuticals, see United States of America Before the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Order Instituting Cease-and-
Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, 
and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-
77058.pdf.
39 For more information on PTC, see United States of America Before the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, PTC INC., Order Instituting Cease-And Desist Proceedings Pursuant To Section 21C of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-And-Desist Order (Feb. 
16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-77145.pdf.
40 Id. For more information on VimpelCom, see Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
VimpelCom to Pay $795 Million in Global Settlement for FCPA Violations (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-34.html.
41 After accounting for various credit and deductions.
42 Qualcomm Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 No. 3-17145 (Mar. 1, 2016) (Administrative 
Proceeding).
43 Qualcomm’s FCPA scrutiny was, at least partially, related to a September 2010 formal order of 
private investigation from the SEC that arose from a “whistleblower’s” allegations made in December 
2009 to the audit committee of the Company’s Board of Directors and to the SEC. As Qualcomm 
previously disclosed, “the audit committee completed an internal review of the allegations with the 
assistance of independent counsel and independent forensic accountants. This internal review into the 
whistleblower’s allegations and related accounting practices did not identify any errors in the Company’s 
financial statements.” Qualcomm Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 25, 2011). More directly 
related to the FCPA scrutiny, according to Qualcomm’s previous disclosure: “On January 27, 2012, the 
Company learned that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California/DOJ has begun 
a preliminary investigation regarding the Company’s compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA), a topic about which the SEC is also inquiring.” Id.
44 Press Release, SEC Charges Engineer and Former Employer with Bribe Scheme in Russia, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-77288-s.pdf.
2018] THE FCPA’S RECORD-BREAKING YEAR 103
(Health Science) Action Disclosure
Novartis45
(Pharmaceutical)
$25
million
Admin. 
Action
SEC
Investigation46
No
Las Vegas Sands47
(Gaming)
$9 million Admin. 
Action
SEC
Investigation48
No
Nortek49
(Construction)
$322,000 NPA Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
Akamai 
Technologies50
(Technology)
$672,000 NPA Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
Analogic51
(Medical Device)
$11.5 
million
Admin. 
Action
Voluntary 
Disclosure
Yes
LAN Airlines52
(Airline)
$9.4 
million
Admin. 
Action
Foreign Media 
Reports
Yes
Johnson Controls53
(Business Services)
$14.4 
million
Admin. 
Action
Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
Key Energy54
(Oil & Gas)
$5 million Admin. 
Action
SEC
Information 
Request55
No
AstraZeneca56
(Pharmaceutical)
$5.5 
million
Admin. 
Action
Industry 
Sweep57
No
                                                                                                                         
45 Novartis AG, Exchange Act Release No. 77,431 at 8–9, 113 SEC Docket 15 (Mar. 23, 2016).  
46 The SEC’s order states: “In connection with the SEC Staff s investigation and in response to 
media reports concerning a competitor in August 2013, Novartis instituted an expansive review of its 
relationships in China with travel and event planning vendors.” Id. at 5.
47 Las Vegas Sands Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 77,555 at 10, 113 SEC Docket 17 (Apr. 7, 
2016). 
48 The SEC’s order states: “In connection with the investigation by the Staff, the LVSC Audit 
Committee retained outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation.” Id. at 9.
49 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Two Non-Prosecution Agreements 
in FCPA Cases (June 7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-109.html.
50 Id.
51 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Medical Device Manufacturer with 
FCPA Violations (June 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-126.html.
52 LAN Airlines S.A., Exchange Act Release No. 78,402 at 10, 114 SEC Docket 13 (July 25, 2016).
53 Johnson Controls, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,287 at 7, 114 SEC Docket 11 (July 11, 
2016).
54 Key Energy Servs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,558 at 8, 114 SEC Docket 15 (Aug. 11, 
2016).
55 The SEC’s order states: “In or around January 2014, the staff of the Commission contacted Key 
Energy with respect to potential FCPA violations by Key Energy. In April 2014, Key Mexico employees 
reported to Key Energy information they had received suggesting the recently resigned country manager 
had promised bribes to one or more Pemex employees during his employment with Key Mexico. Upon 
learning of these allegations, Key Energy reported the allegations to the staff of the Commission.” Id. at 
6.
56 AstraZeneca PLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,730 at 6, 114 SEC Docket 18 (Aug. 30, 2016).
57 In an August 2010 filing, the company disclosed: “AstraZeneca PLC has received inquiries from 
the US Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with an 
investigation into Foreign Corrupt Practices Act issues in the pharmaceutical industry. AstraZeneca is 
cooperating with their inquiries.” AstraZeneca PLC, Annual Report (Form 6-K) (Aug. 9, 2010).
104 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
Nu Skin58
(Healthcare 
Products)
$765,000 Admin. 
Action
Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
AB InBev59
(Beverage)
$6 million Admin. 
Action
SEC
Information 
Request60
No
Och-Ziff61
(Financial Services)
$199
million
Admin. 
Action
DOJ/SEC 
Information 
Requests62
Yes
GlaxoSmithKline63
(Pharmaceutical)
$20
million
Admin. 
Action
Industry 
Sweep64
No
Embraer65
(Airline)
$79.4 
million66
Settled 
Civil 
Complaint 
DOJ/SEC 
Information 
Requests67
No
JPMorgan68 $130.6 Admin. SEC No
                                                                                                                         
58 Nu Skin Enters., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,884 at 5, 115 SEC Docket 1 (Sept. 20, 2016).
59 Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Act Release No. 78,957 at 9, 115 SEC Docket 2 (Sept. 
28, 2016).
60 The SEC’s order states: “AB InBev did not report the 2009 and 2011 complaints to the 
Commission staff before the Commission first contacted AB InBev in October 2011.” Id. at 7.
61 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Och-Ziff Hedge Fund Settles FCPA Charges (Sept.
29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-203.html.
62 The company previously disclosed: “Beginning in 2011, and from time to time thereafter, we 
have received subpoenas from the SEC and requests for information from the U.S. Department of Justice 
(the “DOJ”) in connection with an investigation involving the FCPA and related laws.” Och-Ziff Capital 
Management Group LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2013).
63 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, GlaxoSmithKline Pays $20 Million Penalty to Settle 
FCPA Violations (Sep. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79005-s.pdf.
64 The company previously disclosed: “The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the US Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an industry-wide enquiry in 2010 into whether 
pharmaceutical companies may have engaged in violations of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) relating to the sale of pharmaceuticals, including in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, 
Italy, Poland, Russia and Saudi Arabia. The Group is one of the companies that has been asked to respond 
to this enquiry and is cooperating with the SEC and DOJ. The Group has informed the DOJ and SEC 
about the investigation of its China operations by the Chinese government that was initiated in 2013 and 
the outcome of that investigation. The Group also has briefed the DOJ and SEC regarding other countries 
and issues.” GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Mar. 18, 2016).
65 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Embraer Paying $205 Million to Settle FCPA Charges
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-224.html.
66 The SEC’s resolution documents mention $83.8 million in disgorgement and $14.4 million in 
prejudgment interest. However, the SEC agreed to credit a disgorgement amount that Embraer agreed to 
pay to Brazilian authorities and that disgorgement amount is approximately $18.6 million. See Embraer 
S.A., Annual Report (Form 6-K) (Oct. 24, 2016) (“We agreed to pay US$98.2 million to the SEC (of 
which up to US$20.0 million may be deducted if such amount is actually paid to the MPF and the CVM 
under the TCAC, as described below), as disgorgement of profits.”).
67 In SEC filings, Embraer stated: “In September, 2010, we received a subpoena from the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, or SEC, and associated inquiries from the U.S. Department of Justice, or 
DOJ, concerning possible non-compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, or FCPA, in 
relation to certain aircraft sales outside of Brazil.” Embraer, S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Dec. 31, 
2014).
68 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Paying $264 Million to Settle FCPA 
Charges (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-241.html.
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(Financial Services) million Action Information 
Request69
Braskem70
(Petrochemical)
$65
million71
Settled 
Civil 
Complaint
Foreign Law 
Enforcement 
Investigation
No
Teva 
Pharmaceutical72
(Pharmaceutical)
$236
million
Settled 
Civil 
Complaint
SEC
Information 
Request / 
Voluntary 
Disclosure
No
General Cable73
(Wire & Cable)
$55.3 
million
Admin. 
Action
Voluntary 
Disclosure
Yes
TOTAL $1.07 
billion
As highlighted in Tables V and VI below, SEC corporate FCPA 
enforcement in 2016 was up compared to historical averages—indeed 
record-setting in terms of both the largest number of SEC corporate 
enforcement actions and the largest yearly SEC settlement amounts.
Table V – Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2016)
Year Core Actions
2016 24
2015 9
2014 7
2013 8
2012 8
2011 13
2010 19
                                                                                                                         
69 In an SEC filing, the company stated: “A request from the SEC Division of Enforcement seeking 
information and documents relating to, among other matters, the Firm’s employment of certain former 
employees in Hong Kong and its business relationships with certain clients.” JPMorgan Chase & Co., 
Annual Report (Form 10-Q) (Jun. 30, 2013).  
70 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Petrochemical Manufacturer Braskem S.A. to Pay 
$957 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-
271.html.
71 After accounting for various credits and deductions. See id. (noting that Braskem agreed to pay 
$65 million to the SEC).
72 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Teva Pharmaceutical Paying $519 Million to Settle 
FCPA Charges (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-277.html.
73 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Wire and Cable Manufacturer Settles FCPA and 
Accounting Charges (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-283.html.
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Table VI – SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts (2010 
– 2016)
Year Settlement Amounts
2016 $1.07 billion
2015 $114 million
2014 $327 million
2013 $300 million
2012 $118 million
2011 $148 million
2010 $530 million
Even though SEC FCPA enforcement in 2016 was record-setting, for 
the same reasons discussed above, few meaningful conclusions should be 
drawn. Nevertheless, two statistics are noteworthy: (i) the continued 
prominence of SEC administrative actions, as well as alternative resolution 
vehicles; and (ii) the continued gap between SEC corporate enforcement 
actions and related individual prosecutions.
The first noteworthy statistic is that twenty of the twenty-four (83%) 
corporate enforcement actions were resolved either through an 
administrative order or an NPA. As a result of these controversial resolution 
vehicles, there was no judicial scrutiny of 83% of SEC FCPA enforcement 
actions from 2016.74 This statistic furthers a clear trend regarding SEC 
corporate FCPA enforcement. For instance, in 2015 there was no judicial 
scrutiny of 89% of SEC FCPA enforcement actions, and in 2014 there was 
no judicial scrutiny of 86% of SEC FCPA enforcement actions.75
The second noteworthy statistic is the continued gap between SEC 
corporate enforcement actions and related individual prosecutions. Even 
though SEC Enforcement Director Andrew Ceresney stated in 2016, similar 
to prior years, that “pursuing individual accountability [in FCPA 
enforcement actions] is a critical part of deterrence . . . and the Division of 
Enforcement will continue to do everything we can to hold individuals 
accountable,”76 the fact remains that seventeen of the twenty-four (71%) 
                                                                                                                         
74 For an extended discussion of the origins and controversy of SEC administrative orders and 
DPAs, see generally Mike Koehler, A Snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 SANTA CLARA 
J. INT’L L. 143 (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584661.
75 Of the nine enforcement actions in 2015, only the Hitachi settlement was subject to judicial 
scrutiny. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Sept. 10, 2017) (follow hyperlinks 
under the appropriate year’s heading to find the SEC press releases for each enforcement action). 
Additionally, of the eight enforcement actions in 2014, only the Avon Products settlement was subject 
to judicial scrutiny. Id.
76 Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at ACI’s 
33rd International Conference on the FCPA (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-
ceresney-113016.html.
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corporate enforcement actions did not result in related enforcement actions 
against company employees. Again, this statistic, while troubling, is 
consistent with prior years, as approximately 80% of corporate SEC FCPA 
enforcement actions since 2006 have not (at least yet) resulted in any related 
charges of company employees.77
Analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data separately in Tables I
through VI above is informative given that the DOJ and SEC are separate 
law enforcement agencies and different issues may arise in DOJ and SEC 
FCPA enforcement actions.78 On the other hand, analyzing DOJ and SEC 
FCPA enforcement data in the aggregate is also informative because it 
provides a more holistic view of FCPA enforcement.
C. Aggregate Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
In 2016, the DOJ and SEC together collected approximately $2.3 billion 
in twenty-seven core corporate enforcement actions—both yearly records in 
terms of the number of core corporate enforcement actions, as well as 
aggregate settlement amounts.
Table VII, below, aggregates DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement 
statistics over time and highlights unique circumstances which may have 
significantly skewed enforcement data statistics in any particular year.
Table VII – Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007 – 2016)
Year Core
Actions
Settlement 
Amount
Of Note
2007 15 $149
million
Six enforcement actions involved Iraq Oil 
for Food conduct and these enforcement 
actions comprised 40% of all enforcement 
actions and approximately 50% of the 
$149 million amount.
                                                                                                                         
77 Mike Koehler, A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 23, 2016), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/focus-sec-individual-actions/.
78As a general matter, the SEC has jurisdiction over “issuers” (companies—domestic and foreign 
—with shares registered on a U.S. exchange or otherwise required to make filings with the SEC). In other 
words, the SEC generally does not have jurisdiction over private companies or foreign companies that 
are not issuers. Thus, certain DOJ corporate enforcement actions from 2016 did not have an SEC 
component because the companies (for instance HMT and NCH) were private companies not subject to 
SEC jurisdiction. As a general matter, the DOJ has criminal jurisdiction over “issuers,” “domestic 
concerns,” (i.e., any business entity with a principal place of business in the U.S. or organized under U.S. 
law), and non-U.S. companies and persons to the extent a bribery scheme involved conduct “while in the 
territory of the U.S.” Compared to the SEC’s civil burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence, the 
DOJ has a higher burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution. Perhaps based 
on this difference, several SEC enforcement actions in 2016 (such as SAP, SciClone Pharmaceuticals, 
Qualcomm, Nordion, Novartis, Key Energy, AstraZeneca, Nu Skin, AB InBev, and GlaxoSmithKline) 
did not involve a related DOJ component.
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2008 10 $885
million
The $800 million Siemens enforcement 
action comprised approximately 90% of 
the $885 million amount.
2009 11 $645
million
The $579 million KBR / Halliburton 
Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement action 
comprised approximately 90% of the 
$645 million amount.
2010 21 $1.4 billion Six enforcement actions, all resolved on 
the same day, involved various oil and gas 
companies’ use of Panalpina in Nigeria. 
Panalpina also resolved an enforcement 
action on the same day.
Two enforcement actions (Technip and 
Eni / Snamprogetti) involved Bonny 
Island conduct. 
In other words, there were 14 unique 
corporate enforcement actions in 2010. Of 
further note, the two Bonny Island 
enforcement actions, Technip ($338 
million) and Eni/Snamprogetti ($365 
million) comprised approximately 50% of 
the $1.4 billion amount.
2011 16 $503
million
The $219 million JGC Corp. enforcement 
action involved Bonny Island conduct and 
comprised approximately 44% of the 
$503 million amount.
2012 12 $260
million
No enforcement actions significantly 
skewed the statistics.
2013 9 $720
million
The $398 million Total enforcement 
action comprised approximately 55% of 
the $720 million amount.
2014 10 $1.6 billion Two enforcement actions (Alstom - $772
million and Alcoa - $384 million) 
comprised approximately 72% of the $1.6 
billion amount.  
2015 11 $139
million
No enforcement actions significantly 
skewed the statistics. 
2016 27 $2.3 billion Three enforcement actions (Teva, 
Odebrecht/Braskem and VimpelCom) 
comprised approximately 56% of the 
$2.41 billion amount and five 
enforcement actions (the three mentioned 
above plus JP Morgan and Embraer) 
comprised approximately 72% of the 
amount.
TOTAL 142 $8.7 billion
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D. Individual DOJ and SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions
The statistics highlighted above regarding the notable gap between 
corporate FCPA enforcement and related individual enforcement against 
company employees are not meant to suggest that the DOJ or SEC do not 
bring individual FCPA enforcement actions. The next section highlights 
2016 DOJ and SEC individual FCPA enforcement actions and also provides 
historical comparisons.
As demonstrated in Table VIII, in 2016 the DOJ filed or announced 
FCPA criminal charges against eight individuals.
Table VIII – 2016 DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual Employer / Former 
Employer
Related Corporate
Enforcement 
Action
Moises Abraham Millan 
Escobar79
Associated with various 
privately-held energy 
companies
No
Samuel Mebiame80 Connected to Och-Ziff Yes
Ng Lap Seng and Jeff 
Yin81
Associated with an Unnamed 
Non-Governmental 
Organization 
No
Daniel Perez, Kamta 
Ramnarine, Victor 
Valdez, and Douglas 
Ray82
Associated with Hunt Pan 
Am Aviation Inc.
No
As highlighted in Table IX, the number of DOJ individual FCPA 
enforcement actions in 2016 was generally below historical averages.
                                                                                                                         
79 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Miami Businessman Pleads Guilty 
to Foreign Bribery and Fraud Charges in Connection with Venezuela Bribery Scheme (Mar. 23, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/miami-businessman-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery-and-fraud-charges-
connection-venezuela.
80 Complaint, United States v. Mebiame, 2016 WL 8411041 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:16CR00627), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/943131/download.
81 Indictment, United States v. NG Lap Seng, 2017 WL 2693625 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. S5 15 Cr. 
706 (VSB)), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/913286/download.
82 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Four Businessmen and Two Foreign 
Officials Plead Guilty in Connection with Bribes Paid to Mexican Aviation Officials (Dec. 27, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-businessmen-and-two-foreign-officials-plead-guilty-connection-
bribes-paid-mexican.
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Table IX - DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007 – 2016)83
Year Individuals Charged with Criminal 
FCPA Offenses
2016 8
2015 8
2014 10
2013 12
2012 2
2011 10
2010 33 (including 22 in the Africa Sting case)
2009 18
2008 14
2007 7
As demonstrated in Table X, in 2016 the SEC brought FCPA civil 
charges against eight individuals.
Table X – 2016 SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual Employer / Former 
Employer
Related Corporate 
Enforcement Action
Ignacio Cueto Plaza84 LAN Airlines Yes
Yu Kai Yuan85 PTC Yes
Mikhail Gourevitch86 Nordion Yes
Lars Frost87 BK Medical (Analogic) Yes
Jun Ping Zhang88 CareFx China / Harris 
Corp
No
Daniel Och89
Joel Frank
Och-Ziff Yes
Karl Zimmer90 General Cable Yes
                                                                                                                         
83 Mike Koehler, A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 26, 2017) 
https://fcpaprofessor.com/focus-doj-individual-actions/.
84 Ignacio Cueto Plaza, Respondent, Exchange Act Release No. 77057, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Act Release No. AE-3738, 2016 WL 683570 (Feb. 4, 2016) (cease and desist order).
85 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC: Tech Company Bribed Chinese Officials (Feb. 
16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-29.html.
86 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Engineer and Former Employer with 
Bribe Scheme in Russia (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-77288-s.pdf.
87 Analogic Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 78113, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act 
Release No. AE-3784, 2016 WL 4363422 (July 21, 2016) (cease and desist order).  
88 Jun Ping Zhang, Exchange Act Release No. 78825, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act 
Release No, AE-3800, 2016 WL 4761087 (Sept. 13, 2016) (cease and desist order).
89 Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78989, Investment 
Advisors Act Release No. IA-4540, 2016 WL 5461964 (Sept. 29, 2016) (cease and desist order).
90 Karl J. Zimmer, Exchange Act Release No. 79704, 2016 WL 7474486 (Dec. 29, 2016) (cease 
and desist order).
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As highlighted in Table XI, the number of SEC individual FCPA 
enforcement actions in 2016 was generally higher than historical averages—
likely the result of the record number of corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions brought by the SEC in 2016.
Table XI - SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007 – 2015)91
Year Individuals Charged with Civil 
FCPA Offenses
2016 8
2015 2
2014 2
2013 0
2012 4
2011 12
2010 7
2009 5
2008 5
2007 7
II. NOTEWORTHY ISSUES FROM 2016
Compared to the quantitative statistics set forth above, this section 
highlights various qualitative issues from 2016 FCPA enforcement, 
including several FCPA enforcement action firsts, expansive and evolving 
enforcement theories, and FCPA policy developments. 
A. FCPA Enforcement Action Firsts and Other Qualitative Highlights
FCPA enforcement in 2016 was also notable given the wide spectrum 
of enforcement actions. For instance, as highlighted in Table XII below, 
there were FCPA enforcement actions against U.S. companies as well as 
foreign companies subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction; enforcement actions 
that alleged egregious instances of corporate bribery executed at the highest 
levels of a company (such as VimpelCom and Odebrecht/Braskem) as well 
as enforcement actions based on allegations of “golf in the morning and 
beer-drinking in the evening” (SciClone Pharmaceuticals) and internship 
and hiring practices such as JPMorgan as discussed in more detail below; 
enforcement actions against large multinational companies (such as SAP and 
Qualcomm) as well as small publicly-traded companies (such as Nortek, 
Akamai Technologies and General Cable) and privately-held, limited 
liability companies such as HMT; enforcement actions against business 
                                                                                                                         
91 Mike Koehler, A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, FCPA Professor (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://fcpaprofessor.com/focus-sec-individual-actions/.
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organizations across a wide spectrum of industries such as technology, oil 
and gas, pharmaceutical and medical device, airlines, and financial services; 
and enforcement actions, depicted in the below map, involving conduct 
across the globe from Latin America to South America, to Eastern Europe 
to Africa, with a majority of enforcement actions focusing in whole or in 
part on conduct occurring in China.
In 2016, FCPA enforcement also witnessed several FCPA enforcement 
action firsts and other qualitative highlights.
In terms of firsts, foreign companies with shares listed on a U.S. 
exchange are subject to the FCPA. Given that companies headquartered in 
Canada and Israel comprise approximately 40% of foreign companies with 
shares listed on a U.S. exchange,92 it was only a matter of time before a 
Canadian and Israeli company resolved an FCPA enforcement action.
In 2016, Nordion (Canada) Inc. became the first Canadian company to 
resolve an FCPA enforcement action as the SEC found in an administrative 
order that it violated the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls 
provisions “in connection with payments made to a third party agent to 
                                                                                                                         
92 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, NUMBER OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES REGISTERED AND REPORTING
WITH THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreignsummary2013.pdf.
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obtain Russian government approval to distribute TheraSphere, Nordion’s 
liver cancer treatment, in Russia.”93 According to the SEC, 
Nordion failed to record those payments in a manner that 
accurately and fairly reflected the transactions in its books and 
records [and] also failed to devise and maintain adequate 
internal accounting controls to provide sufficient reassurances 
that Nordion funds were used as authorized, that third-party 
agents were appropriately vetted, and that Nordion adequately 
trained its employees to conduct business in countries with 
significant corruption risks.94
While the $375,000 settlement amount was not notable, the fact that it was 
the first FCPA enforcement action against a Canadian company was notable.
Also in 2016, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. became the first 
Israeli company to resolve an FCPA enforcement action. In pertinent part, 
the parallel DOJ and SEC enforcement action focused on Copaxone, a drug 
used in the treatment of multiple sclerosis and Teva’s most profitable 
product during the relevant time period.95 Although there was no allegation 
or finding that Copaxone was an inferior product or that it compromised
patient health, the enforcement action alleged that Teva Russia and Teva 
Mexico engaged in various schemes to provide things of value to alleged 
foreign officials to influence product purchase. In addition, the enforcement 
action alleged that Teva Ukraine provided various things of value to a 
Ukrainian official to induce him to use his official position within the 
Ukrainian government to improperly influence the registration of Teva 
pharmaceutical products in Ukraine. The bulk of the alleged improper 
conduct focused on Russia, and specifically Teva Russia’s relationship with 
a Russian company owned, controlled, and managed by a Russian official 
with influence over the purchase of pharmaceutical products by the Russian 
government. In this regard, the DOJ specifically alleged that “employees and 
agents of Teva Russia concealed negative information about Russian
Company when Teva was undertaking due diligence, including information 
about Russian Official’s alleged involvement in corruption related to 
Russian government drug procurement auctions.”96 The $519-million 
overall settlement amount in the Teva enforcement action was by far the 
                                                                                                                         
93 Nordion (Canada) Inc., Respondent, Exchange Act Release No. 77290, 2016 WL 825662 (Mar. 
3, 2016) (cease and desist order).
94 Id.
95 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries 
Ltd. Agrees to Pay More than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec. 
22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-
million-resolve-foreign-corrupt. 
96 Information at 15, United States v. Teva LLC, Case No. 1:16-cr-20967-KMW (S.D. Fla. Dec. 
22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/920236/download.  
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largest ever FCPA enforcement action against a pharmaceutical company97
and the fourth-largest FCPA settlement amount of all time.98
In terms of other FCPA enforcement firsts, the SEC’s 2016 FCPA 
enforcement action against Och-Ziff Capital Management Group executives 
Daniel Och and Joel Frank stands out. In connection with a $412-million 
parallel DOJ and SEC enforcement action against the hedge fund for alleged 
improper practices in various African countries,99 the SEC also found in an 
administrative order that Och (CEO and Chairman of the company) was a 
cause of certain of the company’s FCPA books and records violations, and 
that Frank (CFO of the company) was a cause of certain of the company’s 
FCPA books and records and internal controls violations.100 The SEC 
findings as to Och and Frank are believed to be the first time in FCPA history 
that the SEC found the current CEO and CFO of an issuer company liable 
for company FCPA violations.101 “Without admitting or denying the SEC’s 
findings, Och agreed to pay approximately $2.2 million ($1,900,000—
reflecting his estimated share of gain to Och-Ziff resulting from the 
transactions with a Democratic Republic of Congo Partner and $273,718 in 
prejudgment interest),” the largest settlement amount in FCPA history by an 
individual in an SEC enforcement action.102
                                                                                                                         
97 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. 
Agrees to Pay More Than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec. 22, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-million
-resolve-foreign-corrupt.
98 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in 
Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm (providing 
that Siemens paid $450 million to DOJ and $350 million to SEC); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Office of Pub. Affairs, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve 
Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-
agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery (providing that Alstom paid $772 
million to DOJ); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for 
FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm (providing that 
KBR and Halliburton paid $402 million to DOJ and $177 million to SEC); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Teva Pharmaceuticals Paying $519 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-277.html (providing that Teva Pharmaceuticals paid $283 
million to DOJ and $236 million to SEC).
99 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Och-Ziff Capital Management 
Admits to Role in Africa Bribery Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal Fine, (Sept. 29, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/och-ziff-capital-management-admits-role-africa-bribery-
conspiracies-and-agrees-pay-213 (releasing information about Och-Ziff’s three-year deferred 
prosecution agreement); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Och-Ziff Hedge Fund Settles 
FCPA Charges (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-203.html (announcing 
Och-Ziff’s agreement to pay “nearly $200 million to the SEC to settle civil charges of violating the 
[FCPA]”).
100 Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, supra note 90.
101 See Ceresney, supra note 77 (emphasizing that Och-Ziff African Bribery case was the first FCPA 
action against a hedge fund and one that emphasized individual liability of the senior executives).
102 Id.
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Similar to the SEC’s charges against Och and Frank, in 2016 the SEC 
also brought an FCPA enforcement action against Ignacio Cueto Plaza, the 
current CEO of LAN Airlines.103 In pertinent part, the SEC found:
In 2006 and 2007, Ignacio Cueto Plaza (“Cueto”), the CEO of 
LAN Airlines S.A. (“LAN”), authorized $1.15 million in 
improper payments to a third party consultant in Argentina in 
connection with LAN’s attempts to settle disputes on wages 
and other work conditions between LAN Argentina S.A. 
(“LAN Argentina”), a subsidiary of LAN, and its employees. 
At the time, Cueto understood that it was possible the 
consultant would pass some portion of the $1.15 million to 
union officials in Argentina. The payments were made 
pursuant to an unsigned consulting agreement that purported 
to provide services that Cueto understood would not occur. 
Cueto authorized subordinates to make the payments that were 
improperly booked in the Company’s books and records, 
which circumvented LAN’s internal accounting controls.104
Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Cueto agreed to cease 
and desist from future legal violations and to pay a $75,000 civil penalty.105
A few months later, and based on the same core conduct, the DOJ and SEC 
also brought a parallel $22-million FCPA enforcement action against LAN 
Airlines.106 The enforcement action was notable because in the resolution 
documents the DOJ criticized the company for allowing Cueto to remain in 
his position. Specifically, the DOJ stated: “[T]he Company has failed to 
remediate adequately, including significantly by failing to discipline in any 
way the employees responsible for the criminal conduct recounted in the 
statement of facts . . . including misconduct by at least one high-level 
Company executive, and thus the ability of the compliance program to be 
effective in practice is compromised.”107 The LAN enforcement action was 
also notable in that it was believed to be the first FCPA enforcement in 
history against a company headquartered in South America.108 This unique 
                                                                                                                         
103 Ignacio Queto Plaza, supra note 85.
104 Id. at 2. 
105 Id. at 9. 
106 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, LATAM Airlines Group Resolves 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $12.75 Million Criminal Penalty (July 
25, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/latam-airlines-group-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-
investigation-and-agrees-pay-1275; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, LAN Airlines Settles 
FCPA Charges (July 25, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-151.html.
107 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4, United States v. Latam Airlines Group S.A., Case No. 16-
60195-DTKH (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/879136/download.
108 Mike Koehler, Issues to Consider from the LAN Airlines Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR 
(July 27, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues-consider-lan-airlines-enforcement-action/.  
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list soon expanded as 2016 also witnessed FCPA enforcement actions 
against Brazil-based companies Embraer and Odebrecht/Braskem.
The Cueto / LAN Airlines enforcement action based on allegations that 
a Chilean company engaged in improper conduct in Argentina, as well as 
the other 2016 FCPA enforcement actions against foreign companies 
highlighted in Table XII below, raise important questions about the proper 
scope of FCPA enforcement and related policy issues.
Table XII – 2016 FCPA Enforcement Actions Against Non-U.S. 
Companies
Company
(Headquarters)
General Allegations Jurisdictional Basis
SAP
(Germany)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in Panama and 
associated books and 
records and internal 
controls deficiencies
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange
VimpelCom
(The Netherlands)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in Uzbekistan 
and associated books and 
records and internal 
controls deficiencies
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange
LAN Airlines
(Chile)
Improper payments in 
Argentina and associated 
books and records and 
internal controls 
deficiencies
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange
Nordion
(Canada)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in Russia and 
associated books and 
records and internal 
controls deficiencies
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange
Novartis
(Switzerland)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in China and 
associated books and 
records and internal 
controls deficiencies
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange
AstraZeneca
(United Kingdom)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in China and 
Russia, and associated 
books and records and 
internal controls 
deficiencies
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange
2018] THE FCPA’S RECORD-BREAKING YEAR 117
ABInBev
(Belgium)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in India and
associated books and 
records and internal 
controls deficiencies
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange
GlaxoSmithKline
(United Kingdom)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in China and 
associated books and 
records and internal 
controls deficiencies
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange
Embraer
(Brazil)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in Dominican 
Republic, Saudi Arabia, 
Mozambique, and India;
and associated books and 
records and internal 
controls deficiencies
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange; Embraer’s 
wholly-owned U.S. 
subsidiary was active in the 
bribery schemes, including 
by making payments from its 
New York-based bank 
account.
Odebrecht /
Braskem
(Brazil)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in Brazil, 
Angola, Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Mozambique, 
Panama, Peru, and 
Venezuela; and 
associated books and 
records and internal 
controls deficiencies
Odebrecht: Money 
connected to the bribery 
scheme flowed through New 
York-based bank accounts
Braskem: Securities 
registered with the SEC and 
listed on a U.S. exchange;
money connected to the 
bribery scheme flowed 
through New York-based 
bank accounts
Teva Pharma
(Israel)
Improper payments to 
official(s) in Russia, 
Ukraine, and Mexico
Securities registered with the 
SEC and listed on a U.S. 
exchange; e-mails in 
connection with the bribery 
schemes passed through U.S. 
servers; payments in 
connection with the bribery 
schemes were wired through 
U.S. correspondent banks.
While many of the above FCPA enforcement actions against foreign 
companies were technically resolved through “only” FCPA books and 
records and internal controls charges or findings (provisions which have no 
specific jurisdictional elements other than a U.S. securities listing), the 
policy issue remains: what legitimate U.S. law enforcement interests are 
implicated when, for example, a German company interacts with 
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Panamanian officials, a Canadian company interacts with Russian officials, 
or a United Kingdom or Swiss company interacts with Chinese officials?
Even those FCPA enforcement actions highlighted above that did charge 
or find violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions (which do have a 
specific U.S. nexus requirement for foreign companies), do random 
payments or e-mails passing through the U.S. implicate legitimate U.S. law 
enforcement interests when, for instance, a Brazilian company interacts with 
officials in the Dominican Republic, Saudi Arabia, Mozambique, and India,
or an Israeli company interacts with officials in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Mexico?
The FCPA enforcement action against Brazilian companies 
Odebrecht/Braskem presented unique policy issues never before seen in 
FCPA enforcement prior to 2016. What made the enforcement action unique 
is that it was believed to be the first FCPA enforcement action in history 
against a foreign issuer for allegedly bribing its own domestic officials. In 
other words, a large portion of the U.S. enforcement action against the 
Brazilian companies was that they made improper payments to Brazilian 
officials.
The closest FCPA enforcement came to this unique dynamic was in a 
1996 SEC FCPA enforcement action against Italy-based Montedison (the 
first SEC FCPA enforcement action against a foreign issuer).109 Despite 
SEC allegations that the company made improper payments to Italian 
officials, the SEC (while charging the company with books and records and 
internal controls violations) did not charge the company with violating the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.110 According to a knowledgeable source at
the SEC at the time, there was a belief that there were no “foreign” officials 
involved because Montedison, an Italian company, allegedly made 
improper payments to Italian officials.111
The flip side of the U.S. enforcement action against Odebrecht/Braskem 
would be Brazilian law enforcement bringing a multi-million-dollar 
enforcement action against a U.S. company for making allegedly improper 
payments to U.S. officials because the U.S. company has securities listed on 
a Brazilian exchange and/or a portion of the bribe payments may have 
flowed through a Brazil-based account. 
Is the U.S. prepared for this to happen? Long before the unique 2016 
FCPA enforcement against Odebrecht/Braskem, Senator Christopher Coons 
(D-DE) stated during a 2010 Senate FCPA hearing: “Today we are the only 
nation that is extending extraterritorial reach and going after the citizens of 
                                                                                                                         
109 Exchange Act Release No. 15164, Civil Action No. 1:96CV02631 (HHG) (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 
1996), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr15164.txt.
110 See id. (announcing charges of financial fraud and violations of the “corporate reporting, books 
and records, and internal control provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”).
111 See id. (“[T]he scheme was designed to conceal hundreds of millions of dollars of payments 
that, among other things, were used to bribe politicians in Italy and other persons.”).
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other countries, we may someday find ourselves on the receiving end of such 
transnational actions.”112 Regardless of the answer to the above question, in 
the minds of some, FCPA enforcement has become a convenient cash cow 
for the U.S. government.113 The above enforcement actions in 2016 against 
foreign companies, which resulted in approximately $1.5 billion flowing 
into the U.S. treasury, only amplify these concerns.
Moreover, all of the 2016 FCPA enforcement actions against foreign 
companies were against companies headquartered in countries that, like the 
U.S., are parties to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention).114 In other words, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Canada, Brazil, Israel, Belgium, and Chile are all “peer” countries with 
mature FCPA-like laws governing the conduct of their companies coupled 
with a reputable legal system to prosecute such offenses. Given this reality, 
as well as the specific provision in Article 4 of the OECD Convention that 
“when more than one Party has jurisdiction over an alleged offence 
described in this Convention, the Parties involved shall, at the request of one 
of them, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction 
for prosecution,” can it truly be said that the U.S. is the most appropriate
jurisdiction to prosecute certain foreign companies for alleged interactions 
with non-U.S. officials?
In this regard, it is worth highlighting that part of the FCPA reform 
discussion in the 1980s were bills seeking to waive the FCPA’s provisions 
“in the case of any country which the Attorney General has certified to have 
(1) effective bribery or corruption statutes; and (2) an established record of 
aggressive enforcement of such statutes.”115
B. Expansive and Evolving FCPA Enforcement Theories
Substantively, the FCPA’s core anti-bribery provisions have not 
changed since the 1998 amendments to the statute. However, with each 
passing year the range of conduct the enforcement agencies view to be in 
violation of the FCPA seems to expand. There are several practical and 
                                                                                                                         
112 Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 23 (2010) (statement 
of Sen. Coons).
113 See Michael F. Perlis & Wrenn E. Chais, Investigating the FCPA, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2009, 1:06 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/2009/12/08/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-opinions-contributors-michael-
perlis-wrenn-chais.html (“While these causes have increased investigations, governments will keep 
pursuing corrupt business practices for one very simple reason—it’s lucrative.”).
114 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.html.
115 See S. 1797, 99th Cong. (1985) (Competitive America Trade Reform Act of 1985, introduced
on October 29, 1985, by Senator Gary Hart (D-CO)); H.R. 3813, 99th Cong. (1985) (Competitive 
America Trade Reform Act of 1985, introduced on November 21, 1985 by Representative Vic Fazio (D-
CA)).
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provocative reasons for the general increase in FCPA enforcement since 
2004116 and expansive and evolving enforcement theories are certainly at 
the top of the list. What makes this dynamic problematic from a policy 
perspective is that the expansion has generally occurred in the absence of 
any meaningful judicial scrutiny. In this regard, 2016 witnessed the 
continued expansion and evolution of two prominent enforcement theories: 
(i) healthcare workers as “foreign officials,” and (ii) internship and hiring
practices being a form of bribery.
1. Healthcare Workers As “Foreign Officials”
The legislative history is clear that the recipient category Congress had 
in mind when enacting the FCPA was bona fide foreign government officials 
such as presidents, prime ministers, and other heads of state.117 However, 
modern FCPA enforcement actions rarely involve such “foreign officials,” 
but rather individuals deemed “foreign officials” under creative enforcement 
theories not generally subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny.
For instance, as highlighted in Table XIII below, eight corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions involved foreign healthcare workers.
Table XIII – 2016 Corporate Enforcement Actions Involving Foreign 
Healthcare Workers
Enforcement Action Alleged “Foreign Officials”118
SciClone “Healthcare professionals . . . who were employed 
by state-owned hospitals in China”119
Olympus Healthcare professionals in Brazil, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica120
                                                                                                                         
116 See Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) 
https://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101/ (click on “Why has FCPA enforcement generally increased?”).
117 See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 934
(discussing the events that prompted the passage of the FCPA and the types of foreign officials involved 
in those events).
118 Certain of the enforcement actions technically only involved FCPA books and records and 
internal control charges or findings. However, actual charges in many FCPA enforcement actions hinge 
on voluntary disclosure, cooperation, collateral consequences, and other non-legal issues. Thus, even if 
an FCPA enforcement action is resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges, most such actions remain 
very much about the “foreign officials” involved—a fact evident when reading the actual enforcement 
action.
119 SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc., File No. 3-17101, at 2 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Feb. 4, 2016).
120 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Olympus Latin America, Inc., No. 16-
3525(MF) at A5–A13 (D. N.J. Mar. 1, 2016) (including healthcare professionals in Brazil, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica).
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Nordion “Russian government officials to obtain approval 
for TheraSphere” (the company’s liver cancer 
treatment product)121
Novartis Chinese healthcare professionals122
Analogic Individuals at “hospitals or other medical facilities 
that were controlled by the government of 
Russia”123
AstraZeneca “Health care providers, at state-owned and state-
controlled entities in China and Russia”124
GlaxoSmithKline Healthcare professionals in China125
Teva Pharma Russian official described as a high-ranking 
government official in the Russian Federation 
who held official positions on government 
committees and who had the ability to influence 
matters related to the purchase of pharmaceutical 
products by the Russian government, including 
purchases made during annual auctions held by 
the Russian Ministry of Health
Ukrainian official described as a high-ranking 
official within the Ukrainian Ministry of Health 
who held official positions at government 
agencies and on government committees and who 
could take official action on, and exert official 
influence over, matters related to the registration 
and pricing of pharmaceutical products in Ukraine
Physicians and other healthcare providers at state-
owned and state-managed hospitals and healthcare 
facilities in Mexico126
                                                                                                                         
121 See Nordion Inc., File No. 3-17153, at 3 (Mar. 3, 2016) (“Russian government officials to obtain 
approval for TheraSphere.”).
122 See Novartis AG, File No. 3-17177, at 3 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Mar. 23, 2016) (centering on 
the action of Chinese healthcare professionals).
123 Analogic Non-Prosecution Agreement, at A-2 (Dep’t of Justice June 21, 2016).
124 AstraZeneca PLC, File No. 3-17517, at 2 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Aug. 30, 2016).
125 GlaxoSmithKline PLC, File No. 3-17606, at 2 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Sept. 30, 2016).
126 Press Release No. 16-1522, Dep’t of Justice, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Agrees to Pay 
More Than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Dec. 22, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-million-
resolve-foreign-corrupt.
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Because pharmaceutical and other healthcare companies risk debarment 
from U.S. government healthcare programs upon actual conviction of a 
federal crime, it is not surprising that all of the above companies agreed to 
resolve their alleged FCPA scrutiny through SEC administrative actions 
and/or DOJ non-prosecution or deferred prosecution (resolution vehicles 
which generally do not implicate debarment).127 Although the enforcement 
theory that individuals associated with foreign healthcare systems are 
“foreign officials” on par with presidents and prime ministers was first used 
in an FCPA enforcement action in 2002,128 including the eight corporate 
enforcement actions from 2016, this enforcement theory has been used in 
approximately twenty-five corporate enforcement actions.129
None of these corporate actions based on this creative enforcement 
theory were subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny. However, a useful 
data point in examining the legitimacy and validity of this enforcement 
theory is examining whether it has been used in any individual FCPA 
enforcement action. The answer is no, and this is meaningful because 
individuals, as opposed to business organizations, are more likely to contest 
FCPA charges and put the enforcement agencies to their respective burdens
of proof. 
2. Internship and Hiring Practices
The FCPA has specific elements that must be met in order for there to 
be a violation. With increasing frequency, however, it appears that the DOJ 
and SEC have transformed FCPA enforcement into a free-for-all corporate 
ethics statute in which any conduct the enforcement agencies find 
objectionable is fair game to extract a multi-million-dollar settlement from 
a risk-averse corporation.  
An instructive example in 2016 was the $202.6-million FCPA 
enforcement action against JPMorgan based on alleged improper hiring and 
internship practices in the Asia-Pacific region. After discussing the main 
features of the problematic enforcement action, this section highlights why 
the SEC’s enforcement action finding violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery, 
books and records, and internal controls provisions represents a trifecta of 
                                                                                                                         
127 See DAVID W. OGDEN & ELISEBETH COLLINS COOK, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
THE EXCLUSION ILLUSION: FIXING A FLAWED HEALTH CARE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 2–3 (2012)
(describing the current FCPA enforcement system of “huge out-of-court settlements”),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/PDFs/The-Exclusion-
Illusion.pdf.
128 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Syncor Int’l Corp., No. 1:02CV02421 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2002), 
Litigation Release No. 17887 (Dec. 10, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17887.htm 
(discussing a 2002 DOJ and SEC enforcement action against Syncor as the first action based on the 
“foreign official” theory). 
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off-the-rails FCPA enforcement and why anyone who values the rule of law 
should be alarmed.130
To best understand how the JPMorgan enforcement action represents 
off-the-rails FCPA enforcement, a brief overview of the FCPA’s statutory 
framework and key elements is first provided. Generally speaking, the 
elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation are: (i) paying or offering money 
or anything of value, (ii) with a corrupt intent, (iii) to a foreign official, and 
(iv) for purposes of influencing the foreign official in order to obtain or 
retain business.131 While the FCPA does not specifically define the term 
“corrupt,” legislative history instructs that the term was “used in order to 
make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to 
induce the recipient to misuse his official position” and “connotes an evil 
motive or purpose.”132 The FCPA contains so-called third party payment 
provisions that further prohibit money or things of value given to “any 
person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value 
will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign 
official.”133
In addition to the above elements specific to the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions, it is black-letter law that legal liability does not ordinarily hop, 
skip, and jump around a multinational company absent limited exceptions 
due to abuse of corporate form or other alter ego factors. In short, separate 
legal entities (including even those within the same corporate hierarchy) are 
not liable for the legal liability of other entities (whether that liability arises 
in tort, contract or under the FCPA).
Regarding parent company liability for subsidiary conduct, even the 
2012 FCPA Guidance issued by the DOJ and SEC stated:
There are two ways in which a parent company may be liable 
for bribes paid by its subsidiary. First, a parent may have 
participated sufficiently in the activity to be directly liable for 
the conduct—as, for example, when it directed its subsidiary’s 
misconduct or otherwise directly participated in the bribe 
scheme. Second, a parent may be liable for its subsidiary’s 
conduct under traditional agency principles. The fundamental 
characteristic of agency is control. Accordingly, DOJ and SEC 
evaluate the parent’s control—including the parent’s 
knowledge and direction of the subsidiary’s actions, both 
                                                                                                                         
130 Based on the same core conduct as the SEC enforcement action, the DOJ also entered into a 
non-prosecution agreement with JPMorgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited pursuant to which the 
company agreed to pay a $72-million criminal penalty. While this section focuses on the SEC’s 
enforcement action, the DOJ enforcement action is problematic for many of the same reasons discussed 
in this section.
131 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1 et seq. (2012).
132 H.R. REP. NO. 95–640, at 7 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
133 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(a)(3).
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generally and in the context of the specific transaction—when 
evaluating whether a subsidiary is an agent of the parent.134
Relevant to agency principles, the Supreme Court recently held that just 
because a subsidiary may have engaged in conduct that is “sufficiently 
important” to the parent company does not mean that the subsidiary’s 
conduct is imputed to the parent company.135
The FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions 
specifically state that issuers shall:
[M]ake and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions 
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer . . . [D]evise and 
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances that: (i) transactions are 
executed in accordance with management's general or specific 
authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to 
permit preparation of financial statements inconformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria 
applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain 
accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only 
in accordance with management's general or specific 
authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is 
compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and 
appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences . . . 
.136
The FCPA defines “reasonable assurances” and “reasonable detail” to 
mean “such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent 
officials in the conduct of their own affairs.”137 Regarding the books and 
records provisions, the SEC has stated:
[R]ecords which are not relevant to accomplishing the 
objectives specified in the statute for the system of internal 
controls are not within the purview of the recordkeeping 
provision . . . .138
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[T]his provision is not an independent and unrestrained 
mandate to the [SEC] to establish novel or unprecedented 
corporate recordkeeping standards; it is, rather, an integral part 
of Congress' efforts to assure that the business community 
records transactions and assets in such a way as to maintain 
adequate control over them. And, this leads to two important 
conclusions: First, the [FCPA] does not establish any absolute 
standard of exactitude for corporate records. And, second, 
records which are not related to internal or external audits or 
to the four internal control objectives set forth in the [FCPA] 
are not within the purview of the [FCPA’s] accounting 
provisions.139
Likewise, in the 2012 FCPA Guidance the DOJ and SEC state:
The FCPA’s accounting provisions operate in tandem with the 
anti-bribery provisions and prohibit off-the-books accounting.
Company management and investors rely on a company’s 
financial statements and internal accounting controls to ensure 
transparency in the financial health of the business, the risks 
undertaken, and the transactions between the company and its 
customers and business partners. The accounting provisions 
are designed to “strengthen the accuracy of the corporate 
books and records and the reliability of the audit 
process which constitute the foundations of our system of 
corporate disclosure.140
Regarding the internal controls provisions, SEC v. World-Wide Coin, the 
only judicial decision that directly addresses the substance of the provisions, 
states:
The definition of accounting controls does comprehend 
reasonable, but not absolute, assurances that the objectives 
expressed in it will be accomplished by the system. . . . It does 
not appear that either the SEC or Congress, which adopted the 
SEC’s recommendations, intended that the statute should 
require that each affected issuer install a fail-safe accounting 
control system at all costs.141
Similarly, the SEC’s most extensive guidance on the internal controls 
provisions states in pertinent part:
The Act does not mandate any particular kind of internal 
controls system. The test is whether a system, taken as a 
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whole, reasonably meets the statute’s specified objectives. 
“‘Reasonableness,’” a familiar legal concept, depends on an 
evaluation of all the facts and circumstances. . . . The 
accounting provisions principal objective is to reaching 
knowing or reckless conduct.142
It is against this backdrop that the SEC brought an enforcement action 
against JPMorgan based on alleged improper hiring and internship practices 
in the Asia-Pacific region.143 The administrative order, not subjected to any 
judicial scrutiny, found in summary fashion that: 
Investment bankers at JPMorgan’s subsidiary in Asia, 
JPMorgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited (“JPMorgan 
APAC”), created a client referral hiring program to leverage 
the promise of well-paying, career building JPMorgan 
employment for the relatives and friends of senior officials 
with its clients in order to assist JPMorgan APAC in obtaining 
or retaining business.144
According to the SEC, many of JPMorgan APAC’s clients were state-
owned entities and the jobs and internships to relatives and friends of alleged 
“foreign officials” constituted a “personal benefit to the requesting officials 
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in order to obtain or retain investment banking business or other benefits 
from the firm.”145
While the SEC’s order contains extensive findings regarding JPMorgan 
APAC personnel (a separate and distinct legal entity from JPMorgan), the 
order contains nary a meaningful substantive finding regarding individuals 
at JPMorgan (the actual respondent in the SEC’s action). At the risk of 
stating the obvious, this is an important point to consider from the SEC’s 
order because there was no finding or inference that anyone at JPMorgan 
had corrupt intent, a required statutory element.
Indeed, the SEC’s many other findings about JPMorgan’s FCPA 
compliance program strongly suggest the absence of corrupt intent. For 
instance, the SEC acknowledged, among other things: that JPMorgan 
“recognized the FCPA risks in hiring the relatives of foreign government 
officials,” “took steps to educate its employees on the potential dangers,” 
and “instituted training for employees in the [APAC] region specifying that 
pre-clearance from compliance was required before JPMorgan APAC could 
hire Referral Hires . . . .”146 Rather, the order simply states in conclusory 
fashion that “JPMorgan violated the anti-bribery provisions of the federal 
securities laws by corruptly providing valuable internships and employment 
to relatives and friends of foreign government officials in order to assist 
JPMorgan in retaining and obtaining business.”147
In other words, the SEC allowed legal liability to hop, skip, and jump 
around JPMorgan’s organizational structure even though—to use the terms 
found in the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA Guidance—there were no findings that 
JPMorgan itself “participated sufficiently in the activity,” “directed its 
subsidiary’s misconduct or otherwise directly participated in the bribe 
scheme,” or had “knowledge and direct[ed] the subsidiary’s actions.” In 
prior recent FCPA enforcement actions, the SEC has articulated alter ego 
agency theories of liability based on the facts to hold a parent company liable 
for its subsidiary’s conduct.148 The absence of such findings in the JPMorgan
enforcement action would seem to suggest that such facts simply did not 
exist. 
Commenting on this aspect of the JPMorgan enforcement action, FCPA 
practitioners at Debevoise & Plimpton stated:
For at least 90 years, it has been black letter law that a wholly 
owned subsidiary is not an agent merely by virtue of 
ownership, and agency between a parent and subsidiary is 
seldom a basis for ignoring the corporate form as agency is a 
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consensual relationship. Instead, the corporate distinction 
between a parent and subsidiary can be disregarded only when 
the parent “authoriz[es]” the activity (as provided for in the 
FCPA itself) or where the parent has ignored the corporate 
formalities such that the distinction between the companies is 
mere form. Neither of these circumstances is alleged in the 
[JPMorgan enforcement action]. There is no basis for 
suggesting that the term “agent” in the FCPA should be 
interpreted to differ from the common law meaning.149
Even if the corrupt intent of JPMorgan APAC employees could 
somehow be imputed to JPMorgan (and black letter law strongly cautions 
against this), the problematic issue still remains: as required by the anti-
bribery provisions, what thing of value did the alleged Chinese “foreign 
officials” receive?
Surely the internships and jobs constituted a thing of value to the 
individuals who received them, but the FCPA’s statutory provisions clearly 
state that the thing of value must go “to” a foreign official.150 Perhaps 
recognizing this statutory requirement, the SEC creatively found that the 
internships and jobs to relatives were a “personal benefit to the requesting 
officials.” Whether a court would agree with this dubious assertion is an 
open question (as are many other issues in certain recent FCPA enforcement 
actions) because there was no judicial scrutiny of the SEC’s enforcement 
action against JPMorgan. 
Notwithstanding this salient fact and the other above-described legal 
deficiencies in the SEC’s enforcement action, then SEC Director of 
Enforcement Andrew Ceresney boldly proclaimed:
In the wake of some of the Commission’s prior hiring practices 
cases, including our cases against Bank of New York Mellon 
and Qualcomm, some questioned whether providing 
internships could amount to an FCPA violation. But the 
JPMorgan case should put that debate to rest.151
Exercising leverage against risk-averse corporations to extract a 
settlement amount on a disputed legal theory in the absence of judicial 
scrutiny puts little to rest other than the fact that the government possesses 
leverage. Indeed, around the same time the JPMorgan enforcement action 
was resolved in the absence of judicial scrutiny, there was judicial scrutiny 
of the same enforcement narrative in two cases.
In the first case, the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) brought a civil 
action in a United Kingdom court against Goldman Sachs to rescind certain 
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transactions and to obtain the repayment of premiums from Goldman 
Sachs.152 The LIA’s main claim asserted that Goldman Sachs procured the 
LIA to enter into the transactions by the exercise of undue influence, and as 
to a certain transaction (the so-called April Trades), the LIA alleged that 
Goldman Sachs improperly influenced the deputy chairman of the LIA, 
Mustafa Zarti, to cause the LIA to agree to the trades by offering his younger 
brother, Haitem Zarti, a prestigious internship at the bank.153 However, the 
judge concluded:
In my judgment it is going much too far to say that the 
internship influenced Mr. Zarti to place more business with 
Goldman Sachs than he otherwise would have done or that the 
offer had a material influence over the LIA’s decision to enter 
into the April Trades. . . . I find that Mr Mustafa Zarti was keen 
for his younger brother to work as an intern, though there is no 
evidence as to why he thought this was important. Although 
the offer of the internship may have contributed to a friendly 
and productive atmosphere during the negotiation of the April 
Trades, it did not have a material influence on the decision of 
Mr. Zarti and the LIA to enter into the April Trades.154
In the second case, United States v. Tavares, the government alleged that 
defendants ran a corrupt hiring scheme at the Massachusetts Office of the 
Commissioner of Probation (OCP) by catering to the hiring requests from 
members of the state legislature with the hope of obtaining favorable 
legislation for the Department of Probation and OCP.155 At trial, the 
defendants were convicted of various criminal offenses and an appeal 
followed. The First Circuit began its opinion by noting that the defendants 
“misran the Probation Department and made efforts to conceal the patronage 
hiring system.”156 However, the court noted “bad men, like good men, are 
entitled to be tried and sentenced in accordance with the law” and that “not 
all unappealing conduct is criminal.”157
In short, the First Circuit found that the “government had not in fact 
demonstrated that the conduct satisfies the appropriate criminal statutes.”158
Citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Sun-Diamond 
Growers of California, the court stated that the “government must prove a 
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link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific 
official act for or because of which it was given.”159 The court next stated:
In that vein, the Government cannot show the requisite linkage 
merely be demonstrating that the gratuity was given ‘to build 
a reservoir of goodwill that might ultimately affect one or 
more of a multitude of unspecified acts, now and in the future.
. . . The Government’s evidence as to the gratuities predicates 
does not show adequate linkage between the thing of 
“substantial value” conferred by [defendant] (the jobs) and an 
“official act” performed or to be performed. . . . Many of the 
Government’s arguments are predicated on bootstrapping: 
because [defendant] was constantly conferring with legislators 
and hiring based on legislative preferences, any “official act” 
taken by an affected legislator must satisfy the nexus 
requirement. But we do not read the gratuities statute so 
broadly: the Supreme Court in Sun–Diamond “offered a
strictly worded requirement that the government show a link 
to a ‘specific official act’ to supply a limiting principle that 
would distinguish an illegal gratuity from a legal one,” a 
principle unnecessary “in the extortion or bribery 
contexts.” Given a choice between treating a gratuities statute 
as “a meat axe or a scalpel,” the Supreme Court chose the 
latter, and we follow suit.160
Just because two courts recently rejected narratives similar to the 
JPMorgan enforcement narrative does not of course definitely prove that the 
SEC’s case, if subjected to judicial scrutiny, would have failed to establish 
an FCPA anti-bribery violation. It is hard to ignore, however, the parallels 
from the two recent contested actions including the First Circuit’s reminder
that “not all unappealing conduct” is in violation of potentially relevant 
statutes.161 Yet, it sure seems that the enforcement agencies have 
transformed FCPA enforcement into a free-for-all corporate ethics statute in 
which any conduct the enforcement agencies find objectionable is fair game 
to extract a multi-million-dollar settlement from a risk-averse corporation,
and the JPMorgan action is merely the latest example.162
Because the DOJ or SEC rarely face the prospect of judicial scrutiny in 
FCPA enforcement actions, they have, in certain circumstances, used the 
FCPA as a meat axe rather than a scalpel. The cure for “meat-axe” 
                                                                                                                         
159 Id. at 55 (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 414 (1999) 
(internal citations omitted)).
160 Id. at 55–56 (internal citations omitted).
161 Id. at 49–53.
162 E.g., Mike Koehler, Why You Should Be Alarmed by the ADM FCPA Enforcement Action, in
BLOOMBERG BNA WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 1–2 (2014).
2018] THE FCPA’S RECORD-BREAKING YEAR 131
enforcement is judicial scrutiny, but because of how the DOJ and SEC have
chosen to enforce the FCPA (largely through resolution vehicles not 
subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny), and given the dynamics of 
corporate settlements, the meat-axe approach to FCPA enforcement prevails 
regardless of: Congressional intent in enacting the FCPA; the FCPA’s 
statutory provisions; other relevant legal principles; and whether or not a 
court would agree. The SEC’s finding that JPMorgan violated the FCPA’s 
anti-bribery provisions is merely one component of the trifecta of off-the-
rails FCPA enforcement represented by the JPMorgan enforcement action.
A second component relates to the SEC’s finding that JPMorgan 
violated the FCPA’s books and records provisions. Under the heading 
“books and records violations,” the SEC’s order stated:
JPMorgan violated the books and records provisions of the 
FCPA in conjunction with certain Referral Hires. Under [the 
books and records provisions] JPMorgan was required to make 
and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable 
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and 
dispositions of the assets of the issuer. JPMorgan APAC’s 
controls required that investment bankers submit accurate 
questionnaires to compliance for review before client referrals 
from SOEs and foreign government officials could be hired. 
Contrary to that requirement, JPMorgan APAC personnel 
submitted, reviewed, and approved inaccurate compliance 
questionnaires containing false and incomplete information 
which failed to disclose the intended, improper purpose of 
making certain client Referral Hires. JPMorgan’s internal 
records also inaccurately reflected the true number of client 
Referral Hires in the APAC region by taking steps to withhold 
certain headcount information relating to Referral Hires.163
Elsewhere the SEC stated:
JPMorgan also violated the books and records provisions of 
the FCPA. JPMorgan APAC personnel created and 
implemented a system by which inaccurate or incomplete 
questionnaires were submitted, reviewed, and approved by 
compliance in contravention of the internal policy created to 
prevent improper hiring of Referral Hires. The records 
reflected that they were hired for legitimate business purposes 
rather than as hires made to improperly benefit JPMorgan 
APAC investment banking business. JPMorgan APAC’s 
internal records also inaccurately reflected the true number of
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client Referral Hires in the APAC region by taking steps to 
disguise the headcount relating to Referral Hires from others 
within the firm.164
However, the only books and records the SEC found to be problematic 
were JPMorgan APAC questionnaires and other internal records related to 
its internship and hiring program. No JPMorgan books or records were 
found to be problematic and even the problematic JPMorgan APAC books 
and records are clearly not financial or accounting documents which reflect 
“transactions and disposition of the assets” of JPMorgan as required by the 
FCPA’s provisions. Recall, in the words of the SEC itself: “records which 
are not relevant to accomplishing the objectives specified in the statute for 
the system of internal controls are not within the purview of the 
recordkeeping provision.”165
The observation of FCPA practitioner and former DOJ prosecutor 
Michael Schachter prior to the recent internship and hiring enforcement 
actions seems particularly appropriate: “[T]he books and records provision
is, in fact, narrower than the Justice Department and the SEC interpretations 
suggest. . . . [B]oth agencies may be using the provision to punish behavior 
falling outside the FCPA’s reach.”166
Tellingly, and perhaps in recognition of the FCPA’s statutory provisions 
and prior SEC guidance, in the prior BNY Mellon internship enforcement 
action, the SEC cited several internal documents in connection with the 
company’s problematic internship practices, but did not find that BNY 
Mellon violated the FCPA’s books and records provisions. If nothing else, 
the SEC’s finding that BNY Mellon did not violate the provisions, but that 
JPMorgan did, represents inconsistent law enforcement and is just as 
alarming for rule of law purposes.
The third component of the trifecta of off-the-rails FCPA enforcement 
represented by the JPMorgan enforcement action relates to the SEC’s 
finding that JPMorgan violated the FCPA’s internal controls provisions. 
However, the SEC’s order contained an entire section titled “JP 
Morgan’s Policies Prohibited the Hiring of Client Referrals in Exchange for 
Business,” which found in pertinent part as follows: (1) JPMorgan 
recognized the FCPA risk of hiring the relative of foreign officials and 
thereafter took steps to educate employees, including those at JPMorgan 
APAC, on the potential risk including specific training examples concerning 
the risk; (2) JPMorgan’s anti-corruption policy explicitly prohibited hiring 
individuals to win business and required legal and compliance pre-clearance 
for internships or training for relatives of public officials and JPMorgan 
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APAC specifically trained employees on the risk including that pre-
clearance from compliance was required.167
Nevertheless, under the heading “internal controls violations,” the 
SEC’s order stated:
JPMorgan violated the internal accounting controls provisions 
of the FCPA in conjunction with certain Referral Hires. 
JPMorgan failed to devise and maintain an effective system of 
internal accounting controls. JPMorgan’s internal accounting 
controls were insufficiently designed to prevent the corruption 
risks inherent in the hiring of Referral Hires, and therefore 
inadequate to enforce or effectuate JPMorgan’s referral hiring 
policy. JPMorgan recognized the inherent risks in hiring 
Referral Hires, yet proceeded with a system that failed 
adequately to address those risks. The safeguards put in place 
by JPMorgan APAC to minimize compliance and FCPA risks 
were not effective to curb the true purpose of the Client 
Referral Program. JPMorgan APAC’s referral hiring 
questionnaire was designed to ensure that Referral Hires were 
hired based on merit and not for improper purposes. However, 
in practice the Client Referral Program operated as a separate 
tier of employment within JPMorgan APAC where hiring and 
retention decisions were based on client relationships and 
potential revenue and not employee merit. . . . JPMorgan 
APAC attempted to put in place protections to mitigate the 
inherent conflicts and FCPA risks in hiring Referral Hires. 
However, these protections were insufficient to prevent the 
violations.168
The SEC’s findings are alarming on several levels. For starters, the 
statutory standard is that JPMorgan was required to have internal accounting 
controls “sufficient to provide reasonable assurance” that the statutory 
objectives are met, with “reasonable” specifically defined to mean “such 
level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in 
the conduct of their own affairs.”169 The SEC’s finding that JPMorgan 
lacked an “effective system of internal controls” or that its controls were
“insufficient to prevent” or detect the problematic internships or hires are 
simply standards that do not exist in the FCPA. 
Not only are these SEC-articulated standards not found in the FCPA, but 
the only judicial decision to directly address the substance of the internal 
controls provisions specifically states that “[t]he definition of accounting 
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controls . . . comprehend[s] reasonable, but not absolute, assurances . . . .”170
Moreover, even SEC guidance relevant to the internal controls provisions 
states that the “accounting provisions principal objective is to reach knowing 
or reckless conduct” by the issuer.171
Further alarming is that many of the internal controls the SEC found 
most problematic were those of JPMorgan APAC, not JPMorgan the actual 
respondent in the SEC’s enforcement action. Per the SEC’s own findings, 
JPMorgan had existing internal controls relevant to internship and hiring 
practices but JPMorgan APAC employees acted in contravention of 
company policy and failed to follow the firm’s internal accounting controls. 
Per the SEC’s own findings, JPMorgan APAC employees “often provided 
inaccurate or incomplete information as part of the legal and compliance 
review designed to prevent these violations or withheld key information so 
that the Referral Hires would pass compliance review” and otherwise 
“provided inaccurate or incomplete answers to secure approval for hires 
without revealing the links to business as a result of certain Referral 
Hires.”172
Against this backdrop, it is nothing short of astonishing that the SEC 
found JPMorgan in violation of the internal controls provisions which 
require issuers to “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances” that the statutory 
objectives are satisfied.173 Even more astonishing is how SEC enforcement 
officials described JP Morgan’s conduct (as opposed to JPMorgan APAC’s 
conduct) in its press release announcing the enforcement action. In the words 
of then SEC Director of Enforcement Ceresney:
JPMorgan engaged in a systematic bribery scheme by hiring 
children of government officials and other favored referrals 
who were typically unqualified for the positions on their own 
merit. JPMorgan employees knew the firm was potentially 
violating the FCPA yet persisted with the improper hiring 
program because the business rewards and new deals were 
deemed too lucrative.174
Kara Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA 
Unit) stated:
The misconduct was so blatant that JPMorgan investment 
bankers created ‘Referral Hires vs Revenue’ spreadsheets to 
track the money flow from clients whose referrals were 
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rewarded with jobs. The firm’s internal controls were so weak 
that not a single referral hire request was denied.175
The merging of conduct of two separate and distinct legal entities, 
particularly given the actual findings in the SEC’s order, should be alarming 
to anyone who values the rule of law. Perhaps it is not astonishing though 
when one recognizes that FCPA enforcement is not necessarily about the 
law and facts, but a game of risk aversion in which issuers have little appetite 
for putting their primary financial regulator to its burden of proof. As the 
Second Circuit has observed, “trials are primarily about the truth” whereas 
other forms of SEC settlement “are primarily about pragmatism.”176
What is interesting about the JP Morgan enforcement action and 
numerous other SEC FCPA enforcement actions in recent years that have 
been resolved in the absence of any judicial scrutiny is that they have occurred 
during the leadership of Mary Jo White. As Chair of the SEC, White rightly 
noted that the “public airing of facts, literally in open court, creates 
accountability for both defendants and the government.”177 White further 
stated:
How we resolve disputes and how we decide the guilt or 
innocence of an accused are the true measure of our 
democracy. . . . [T]rials allow for more thoughtful and nuanced 
interpretations of the law in a way that settlements and 
summary judgments cannot. . . . [T]he death of trials would… 
remove a source of disciplined information about matters of 
public significance . . . [i]t would mean the end of an 
irreplaceable public forum and would mean that more of the 
legal order would proceed behind closed doors.178
Of further interest is that some of the most forceful commentary about 
the SEC’s internship and hiring practice inquiries has come from former 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt who stated in a Wall Street Journal op-ed:
[SEC] regulators now suggest that such hiring overseas is a 
form of untoward influence, akin to bribing foreign officials to 
win business. The accusation is scurrilous and hypocritical. If 
you walk the halls of any institution in the U.S.—Congress, 
federal courthouses, large corporations, the White House, 
American embassies and even the offices of the SEC—you are 
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likely to run into friends and family members of powerful and 
wealthy people.179
Even a New York Times columnist (hardly a media source to often 
question aggressive SEC enforcement) stated after JPMorgan’s FCPA 
scrutiny surfaced:
But hiring the sons and daughters of powerful executives and 
politicians is hardly just the province of banks doing business 
in China: it has been a time-tested practice here in the United 
States.180
Double standard issues aside, it is difficult to square existing legal 
authority, as well as enforcement agency guidance, with the findings in the 
JPMorgan enforcement action, and anyone who values the rule of law should 
be alarmed. Indeed, one of the supreme ironies of the JPMorgan enforcement 
action is that JPMorgan’s counsel was Mark Mendelsohn, the former DOJ 
FCPA Unit Chief and self-described “architect” of the DOJ’s “modern 
[FCPA] enforcement program.”181 According to reports, during the 
settlement negotiation process Mendelsohn reportedly authored a white 
paper submitted to the DOJ and SEC setting out the bank’s concern about 
the enforcement approach.182
Sure, JPMorgan could have forced the SEC to prove its enforcement 
theories to someone other than itself. But for that to happen, the SEC would 
have first had to file a civil complaint in federal court—an event which 
surely would have caused the company’s stock price to fall. As Andrew 
Weissmann (DOJ Fraud Section Chief at the time of the JPMorgan action) 
previously stated regarding the FCPA: “the grayness of a statute that is 
enforced against corporations is particularly heinous because there’s no way 
to actually have that litigated as a realistic matter.”183
Even if the drop to JPMorgan’s stock would have been small—say 3% 
and short-lived—the hit to JPMorgan’s market capitalization, an important 
data point for investors and an important metric by which business manager 
performance is judged, would have been much higher than the $202.6-
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million settlement amount. Against this backdrop, resolving an FCPA 
enforcement action (even if based on dubious theories of enforcement) 
seems like a rational corporate decision in the best interest of shareholders. 
Consider, however, the long-term effects of such corporate risk 
aversion. In this regard, the alarming JPMorgan enforcement action should 
serve as a reminder that the business community is, at least in part, 
responsible for the current aggressive FCPA enforcement climate. Indeed, 
as Homer Moyer (a dean of the FCPA bar) has observed:
One reality is the enforcement agencies' [FCPA] views on 
issues and enforcement policies, positions on which they are 
rarely challenged in court.  The other is what knowledgeable 
counsel believe the government could sustain in court, should 
their interpretations or positions be challenged.  The two may 
not be the same.  The operative rules of the game are the 
agencies' views unless a company is prepared to go to court or 
to mount a serious challenge within the agencies.184
There are many who cheer more FCPA enforcement regardless of the 
enforcement theories. For these cheerleaders, there is much to cheer in the 
JPMorgan enforcement action and its $202.6-million settlement amount will 
be blindly inserted into FCPA enforcement statistics and trotted out at every 
available opportunity to demonstrate how the U.S. is the leader in anti-
bribery enforcement.  
Yet for those who value the rule of law, there is much to lament in the 
JPMorgan enforcement action. When speaking of FCPA enforcement, the 
DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General previously delivered a speech titled 
“International Criminal Law Enforcement: Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption 
and Beyond.”185 As suggested by the title of the speech, the DOJ official 
spoke about FCPA enforcement and how the increase in FCPA enforcement 
was consistent with the U.S.’s global approach to promote the rule of law. 
The speech began with two rhetorical questions:  is the rule of law “more 
than just a catch phrase” and “does the rule of law have any real meaning.”186
These are great questions to ask in the aftermath of the JPMorgan 
enforcement action.
Regardless of the legitimacy of the JPMorgan enforcement action and 
accepting the DOJ’s and SEC’s enforcement theories at face value, there is 
a compliance message to the business community in the enforcement action:
FCPA compliance is not just a legal function—not just a finance and 
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auditing function—but also a human resources function. In overseeing 
internship and hiring practices, human resources professionals should ask 
the following questions to minimize FCPA scrutiny:
• Does the company’s anti-corruption policy explicitly address the 
hiring of family members, relatives, etc. of “foreign officials”?
• Do HR employees receiving FCPA training?
• Does the company require that every application for a full-time hire 
or an internship be routed through a centralized HR application 
process?
• Does the company’s application process require that each applicant 
indicate whether he/she is related to or otherwise connected to a 
“foreign official” or has recently been a “foreign official”?
• Is a “foreign official” requesting that the company provide an 
internship or job opportunity?
• Is there an actual open internship or job position or is the company 
creating a new internship or job position?
• Does the internship or job applicant possess the requisite skills and 
qualifications for such a position?
• Does the company’s Code of Conduct require that every year each 
employee certify that he or she is not responsible for hiring through 
a non-centralized channel?
C. FCPA Policy Developments
The year 2016 was notable not just for record-breaking and diverse 
FCPA enforcement activity often tied to expansive and evolving 
enforcement theories, but for FCPA policy developments as well. As 
discussed in this section, both the DOJ and SEC renewed their long-standing 
FCPA enforcement commitment and the DOJ released a one-year FCPA 
Pilot Program designed in large part to further motivate business 
organizations to voluntarily disclose FCPA issues to better facilitate 
enforcement actions against culpable individuals.
Consistent with previous years, DOJ and SEC enforcement officials 
renewed their commitment to robust FCPA enforcement. For instance, 
Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates stated: “At the Justice Department, we 
are committed to ensuring that individuals and corporations in the 
marketplace are operating on a level playing field. Deceit, fraud and 
corruption distort that balance, and so it is important that we all do our part 
to keep the scales evenly weighted.”187 Likewise, SEC Director of 
Enforcement Andrew Ceresney stated: “Investigating and bringing 
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enforcement actions for FCPA violations has been an important priority for 
us at the SEC and we have taken a lead role in fighting corruption 
worldwide.”188 Similarly, SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated: “Vigorous 
enforcement of the FCPA is a high priority for both the SEC and the 
Department of Justice.”189
Beyond such unsurprising statements, the most notable enforcement 
agency policy development of 2016 was the release of a DOJ policy 
document titled “The Fraud Section’s FCPA Enforcement Plan and 
Guidance.”190 The non-binding policy document outlined three steps in the 
DOJ’s “enhanced FCPA enforcement strategy.”191 Two of the steps outlined 
in the policy document (an increase in the DOJ’s and FBI’s FCPA resources 
as well as the DOJ “strengthening its coordination with foreign 
counterparts”) were previously articulated by the DOJ and thus represented 
rather humdrum developments.192 The third step outlined by the DOJ, that 
its Fraud Section “is conducting an FCPA enforcement pilot program,”193 is 
the focus of this section which grades the pilot program by addressing the 
following issues: 
x The obvious logical gap in the pilot program;
x How the pilot program, both in terms of rhetoric and substance, is 
really nothing new;
x Why the corporate community should take the pilot program with 
a grain of salt;
x How the pilot program falls short of best achieving the laudable 
goals articulated by the DOJ compared to other alternatives 
previously advanced; and
x The pilot program in practice including how the pilot program is 
currently failing as measured against the DOJ’s “main goal” of the 
program.
Logical Gap in the Pilot Program
Prior to addressing the obvious logical gap in the pilot program, it is 
important to understand the informational gap which the pilot program seeks 
to address. This gap is best demonstrated by the below picture.
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In other words, business organizations (whether through internal audits, 
compliance hotlines, or other means) often possess information suggesting 
that employees within the organization or third parties engaged by the 
organization have violated the FCPA. Because business organizations 
generally do not have a legal obligation to disclose this information, a fact 
rightly recognized in the pilot program, the FCPA’s dual enforcers—the 
DOJ and SEC—often do not learn about FCPA violations. Indeed, at the 
pilot program press conference, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell 
candidly admitted as much when she stated that the DOJ is “‘confident that 
there are lots of FCPA violations’” that do not come to the DOJ’s 
attention.194
In other words, there are likely many FCPA violations (at least based on 
current enforcement theories) that occur in the global marketplace that are 
not disclosed to the enforcement agencies. Because, such violations (again 
in the eyes of the enforcement agencies) are not disclosed to the enforcement 
agencies, there is no enforcement action. Because there is no enforcement
action, the individual or individuals engaging in the problematic conduct 
will not be held legally accountable. Because the individuals are not being 
held legally accountable, FCPA enforcement is not as effective as it could 
be in achieving maximum deterrence. 
As depicted in the picture above, the FCPA enforcement landscape thus 
has a deep gorge and how to bridge this gorge has long perplexed the FCPA 
enforcement agencies. As highlighted below, encouraging voluntary 
disclosure by business organizations of FCPA violations has long been the 
DOJ’s best answer. Indeed, in the words of previous DOJ officials, the DOJ 
“absolutely needs companies through their firms to provide us with their 
[FCPA] investigations”195 and in most years approximately 50% of 
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corporate FCPA enforcement actions originate with voluntary 
disclosures.196
The pilot program represented the DOJ’s latest attempt to encourage 
voluntary disclosures and was “intended to encourage companies to disclose 
FCPA misconduct to permit the prosecution of individuals whose criminal 
wrongdoing might otherwise never be uncovered by or disclosed to law 
enforcement.” In comments after the release of the pilot program, Caldwell 
stated: 
[The] idea of the Pilot Program, in part, is get the company to 
self-report by giving it some incentives so that when it comes 
in and self-reports, it will give us the information that it has
. . . that will in turn enable us to prosecute individuals because 
we recognize that prosecution of individuals is the biggest 
deterrent . . . to corporate wrongdoing, and criminal 
wrongdoing . . . that is really one of the main goals of the Pilot 
Program.197
This objective, however, suffers from an obvious logical gap in that for 
years the DOJ has had the opportunity to do just what the pilot program 
seeks to accomplish. Specifically, between 2011 and 2015, nineteen
corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions originated with voluntary 
disclosures. However, in only five of those instances (26%) was there a 
related DOJ prosecution of individuals. The DOJ’s stated objective in 
establishing the pilot program thus seems to lack credibility for the simple 
fact that if the goal of the pilot program is to encourage voluntary disclosures 
to permit the DOJ to prosecute individuals, then why have 74% of corporate 
DOJ FCPA enforcement actions over the past five years that originated with 
a voluntary disclosure not resulted in any related DOJ prosecution of 
individuals?198 Logical gap aside, it is important to recognize that the pilot 
program, both in terms of rhetoric and substance, was really nothing new.
Nothing New in the Pilot Program
It’s been said that “there’s a sucker born every minute” and to some, the 
pilot program represented a new DOJ policy. However, just because the DOJ 
held a press conference to announce the pilot program and ascribed a new 
label to pre-existing DOJ rhetoric and practice, this did not make the pilot 
                                                                                                                         
196 See Mike Koehler, Voluntary Disclosure Statistics, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 10 2014), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/voluntary-disclosure-statistics/ (illuminating how in fact 59% of SEC FCPA 
enforcement actions and 55% of DOJ FCPA enforcement actions have been based on voluntary 
disclosures).
197 Assistant AG Caldwell on the DOJ’s Pilot Program (C-SPAN 2 television broadcast Nov. 4, 
2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4629540/assistant-ag-caldwell-dojs-pilot-program.
198 For a hypothesis why so few DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions result in related 
individual prosecutions, see Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements on FCPA Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 499–500 (2015).
142 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
program new. Knowledgeable observers quickly recognized this upon 
digesting the specifics of the pilot program. For instance, former DOJ FCPA 
Unit Chief Chuck Duross and former DOJ FCPA Unit Assistant Chief James 
Koukios stated: “in fact, there is not much that is new in the guidance.”199
Indeed, for over a decade the DOJ has encouraged voluntary disclosure of 
FCPA violations coupled with repeated assurances that voluntary disclosure 
will result in meaningful credit.
For instance, in 2006 then-DOJ Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher 
stated:
When serious FCPA issues do arise, we strongly encourage 
you and your clients to voluntarily disclose those issues. . . .
[W]hat I can say is that there is always a benefit to corporate 
cooperation, including voluntary disclosure . . . . The fact is, if 
you are doing the things you should be doing—whether it is 
self-policing, self-reporting, conducting proactive risk 
assessments, improving your controls and procedures, training 
on the FCPA, or cooperating with an investigation after it 
starts—you will get a benefit. It may not mean that you or your 
client will get a complete pass, but you will get a real, tangible 
benefit.200
Likewise, in 2009 then DOJ Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer 
stated:
I strongly urge any corporation that discovers an FCPA
violation to seriously consider making a voluntary disclosure
and always to cooperate with the Department. The Sentencing 
Guidelines and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations obviously encourage such conduct, 
and the Department has repeatedly stated that a company will 
receive meaningful credit for that disclosure and that 
cooperation.201
Indeed, one of Breuer’s favorite talking points on the FCPA circuit was 
to encourage voluntary disclosure of FCPA violations and offer repeated 
assurances that it would result in meaningful credit by the DOJ. In 2009,
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Breuer stated: “I want to assure you that the Department’s commitment to 
meaningfully reward voluntary disclosures and full and complete corporate 
cooperation will continue to be honored in both letter and spirit.”202 In 
another 2010 FCPA speech, Breuer stated: “If you come forward and if you 
fully cooperate with our investigation, you will receive meaningful credit for 
having done so.”203 In yet another 2010 FCPA speech, Breuer stated:
As a former defense lawyer, I understand that the question of 
whether to self-report is a difficult one. But I can assure you 
that if you do not voluntarily disclose your organization’s 
conduct, and we discover it on our own, or through a 
competitor or a customer of yours, the result will not be the 
same . . . . [T]here is no doubt that a company that comes 
forward on its own will see a more favorable resolution than 
one that doesn’t.204
In a 2013 FCPA speech, then Deputy Attorney General James Cole 
stated:
What is the benefit of voluntary disclosure and cooperation? 
We fully understand that companies will act in their own best 
interest. So we have sought to incentivize companies with 
tangible benefits for their voluntary disclosure and 
cooperation—beyond the reductions already built into the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Such benefits have taken the form of 
declinations . . . , resolutions short of a guilty plea like deferred 
prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, and 
allowing companies to self-report their remediation efforts 
instead of being subject to the oversight of a corporate 
monitor. We have also, in appropriate cases, supported 
reduced penalties below those suggested by the Sentencing 
Guidelines.205
Bringing DOJ rhetoric on this issue to the months leading up to the pilot 
program, Assistant Attorney General Caldwell stated in November 2015:
[V]oluntary self-disclosure in the FCPA context does have 
particular value to the department. Because of that, we want to 
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encourage self-disclosure by making clear that, when 
combined with cooperation and remediation, voluntary 
disclosure does provide a tangible benefit when it comes time 
to make a charging decision.206
Albert Einstein is credited with saying that insanity is “doing the same 
thing over and over again and expecting different results.” You don’t need 
to be an Einstein to realize, as the above examples clearly demonstrate, that 
the main thrust of the pilot program (that is to encourage voluntary 
disclosure through meaningful credit) was nothing new as the DOJ has been 
saying the same thing over and over again for a decade. If anything, the 
DOJ’s latest attempt in the pilot program to encourage voluntary disclosure 
should be viewed as an acknowledgement that the DOJ’s long-standing 
efforts on this issue have not been as successful as hoped. 
The rhetoric in the pilot program is not the only aspect of the program 
that was not new. As discussed next, the substance of the pilot program was
also not new. The key language in the pilot program that the DOJ said it will 
now use to encourage voluntary disclosure (along with cooperation and 
timely and appropriate remediation) was set forth in two sections. The first 
section addresses what may happen if a company voluntarily discloses, 
cooperates, and timely and appropriately remediates:
In such cases, if a criminal resolution is warranted, the Fraud 
Section’s FCPA Unit: may accord up to a 50% reduction off 
the bottom end of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range, if a 
fine is sought; and generally should not require appointment 
of a monitor if a company has, at the time of resolution, 
implemented an effective compliance program. Where those 
same conditions are met, the Fraud Section’s FCPA Unit will 
consider a declination of prosecution. . . . To qualify for any 
mitigation credit under this pilot . . . the company should be 
required to disgorge all profits from the FCPA misconduct at 
issue.207
The second section addressed what may happen if a company does not 
voluntarily disclose, yet nevertheless cooperates and timely and 
appropriately remediates:
If a company has not voluntarily disclosed its FCPA 
misconduct . . . , it may receive limited credit under this pilot 
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program if it later fully cooperates and timely and 
appropriately remediates. Such credit will be markedly less 
than that afforded to companies that do self-disclose 
wrongdoing . . . Specifically, in circumstances where no 
voluntary self-disclosure has been made, the Fraud Section’s 
FCPA Unit will accord at most a 25% reduction off the bottom 
of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range.208
The specific percentages above that the DOJ may offer in the pilot 
program are nothing new because there have been numerous instances, prior 
to the pilot program, in which the DOJ resolved corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions using the same thresholds it “may” use going forward.
Specifically, the DOJ had already offered companies that voluntarily 
disclosed, cooperated, and remediated up to, and indeed over, a 50% 
reduction off the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines. Examples 
include: Avon (58% below the minimum amount suggested by the 
guidelines score) and Pride International (55% below the minimum amount 
suggested by the guidelines score).209 Other enforcement actions that 
originated with voluntary disclosure and involved the company cooperating 
and effectively remediating came close to 50% or at the very least exceeded 
25% off the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines. Examples 
include: ABB (38% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines 
score), ADM (35% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines 
score), and Pfizer (34% below the minimum amount suggested by the 
guidelines score).210 In short, the carrot embedded in the pilot program for 
voluntarily disclosing, cooperating, and remediating was really nothing new.
Nor is the other carrot embedded in the pilot program new (that is even 
if there is no voluntary disclosure, a company that cooperates and remediates 
may receive 25% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines 
score). For instance, the Data Systems and Solutions enforcement action did 
not originate from a voluntary disclosure, yet the settlement amount was 
30% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines score. 
Likewise, the HP enforcement action did not originate from a voluntary 
disclosure, yet the DOJ settlement amount was 30% below the minimum 
amount suggested by the guidelines score. Notably, the JGC of Japan 
enforcement action did not originate from a voluntary disclosure nor did the 
company fully and completely cooperate, yet the DOJ settlement amount 
was 30% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines score. 
Further, the Technip enforcement action did not originate from a voluntary 
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disclosure, yet the DOJ settlement amount was 25% below the minimum 
amount suggested by the guidelines score.
In short, the numbers tell the true story and it is that both in terms of 
rhetoric and substance, the DOJ’s FCPA pilot program was really nothing 
new.211
This alone should cause the corporate community to yawn at the pilot 
program. However, as highlighted below there were also several other 
reasons why the corporate community should take the pilot program with a 
grain of salt.
The Corporate Community Should Take the Pilot Program with a Grain 
of Salt
To be clear, the corporate community should not ignore the pilot 
program. After all, the DOJ has extreme leverage over business 
organizations subject to FCPA scrutiny and it is always wise to at least be 
cognizant of what an adversary possessing a big and sharp stick is saying. 
Nevertheless, absent limited circumstances not often present in instances of 
FCPA scrutiny, how to respond to internal breaches of FCPA compliance 
policies is a business decision entrusted to those charged with managing the 
business organization. In exercising this business judgment, the corporate 
community should take the pilot program with a grain of salt for reasons 
described above and for the additional four reasons described below.
First, the pilot program is non-binding and commits the DOJ to 
absolutely nothing. Like prior DOJ guidance on the FCPA, such as the 2012 
FCPA Guidance, the pilot program stated: “This memorandum is for internal 
use only and does not create any privileges, benefits, or rights, substantive 
or procedural, enforceable by any individual, organization, party or witness 
in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.”212
Moreover, eligibility for the specific percentage reductions highlighted 
above is contingent upon a company meeting the DOJ’s definition of 
“voluntary self-disclosure,” “full cooperation,” and “timely and appropriate 
remediation.” As to these key concepts, the DOJ possesses absolute, 
unreviewable discretion in determining whether the concepts have been 
satisfied to its satisfaction. In addition, the specific percentage reductions 
are littered with qualifying discretionary terms such as “may” and “will 
consider.” As FCPA practitioners have rightly observed, the pilot program 
“is riddled with caveats that provide plenty of room for FCPA prosecutors 
to award something less than full mitigation credit to a cooperating 
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company.”213 Finally, the specific percentage thresholds in the pilot program 
only address the final number that results from the sentencing guidelines 
equation for determining a fine range. As knowledgeable observers 
recognize, the reality is that this final number is the product of and 
contingent upon several less-than-transparent discretionary calls made by 
the DOJ earlier in the equation. Again, FCPA practitioners rightly observed 
that even under the pilot program “prosecutors and agents continue to wield 
significant discretion, and factors such as the severity of the underlying 
conduct, the completeness of the disclosure, and the sufficiency of 
remediation efforts are still likely to play a major role in determining the 
disposition of the case.”214
The second reason why the corporate community should take the pilot 
program with a grain of salt is perhaps obvious, but bears repeating: the DOJ 
is an adversary. Imagine a business organization facing an adversary in other 
legal actions and the adversary states that it “may” or “will consider” a lower 
settlement amount should it prevail if the business organization acts 
according to the adversary’s discretionary commands.215 It is doubtful that 
any business organization, and rightly so, would accede to the demands of 
this adversary. While the DOJ possesses bigger and sharper sticks than most 
legal adversaries, the facts remain that the DOJ is an adversary to a business 
organization under FCPA scrutiny and the business organization has no legal 
or moral obligation to assist the DOJ. As the pilot program correctly noted:
“Nothing in the [pilot program] is intended to suggest that the government 
can require business organizations to voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate, or 
remediate. Companies remain free to reject these options and forego the 
credit available under the pilot program.”216
The third reason why the corporate community, at least so-called issuers 
under the FCPA, should take the pilot program with a grain of salt is that it 
is an incomplete program because issuers are subject to FCPA enforcement 
by both the DOJ and SEC, but the pilot program is a DOJ program only. To 
be sure, just like the DOJ, the SEC has long encouraged voluntary disclosure 
of FCPA violations coupled with repeated assurances that voluntary 
                                                                                                                         
213 Will DOJ’s FCPA Pilot Program Fly with Companies Considering Self-Disclosure?, STEPTOE 
& JOHNSON LLP (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-11194.html.
214 Drew A. Harker et al., DOJ Launches FCPA Enforcement Pilot Program to Encourage 
Voluntary Disclosure, ARNOLD & PORTER ADVISORY (Apr. 8, 2016), 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/04/doj-launches-fcpa-pilot.
215 Mike Koehler, Six Reasons Why the Corporate Community Should Take the DOJ’s “Pilot 
Program” With a Grain of Salt, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 19, 2009, 12:04 AM), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/reasons-why-the-corporate-community-should-take-the-dojs-pilot-program-
with-a-grain-of-salt/.
216 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE 4 (Apr. 5 2016), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/file/838386/download.
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disclosure will result in meaningful credit.217 However, unless and until the 
SEC articulates a similar FCPA program (a program that will likely suffer 
from the same deficiencies as the DOJ’s program), the DOJ’s FCPA pilot 
program addresses only half of the enforcement landscape facing issuers.
The fourth and perhaps biggest reason why the corporate community 
should take the pilot program with a grain of salt is that it only addresses a 
relatively minor component of the overall financial consequences to a 
business organization that is the subject of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement. 
For obvious reasons, settlement amounts in FCPA enforcement actions tend 
to get the most attention. After all, settlement amounts are mentioned in 
DOJ/SEC press releases, press releases generate media coverage, and the 
corporate community reads the media. However, knowledgeable observers 
recognize, as depicted in the below picture, that FCPA scrutiny and 
enforcement results in “three buckets” of financial exposure to a business 
organization.
In nearly every instance of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement, bucket one
(pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses) is the largest 
financial hit to a business organization. The reasons for this are both 
practical and potentially provocative. In terms of the practical, all instances 
of FCPA scrutiny have a point of entry. For instance, problematic conduct 
in China that then often results in the “where else” question from the 
enforcement agencies which often prompts the company under scrutiny to 
conduct a much broader review. In terms of the provocative, FCPA scrutiny 
can easily become a billing boondoggle for FCPA Inc. participants.
A couple of specific examples highlight how extensive pre-enforcement 
action professional fees and expenses can become. For instance, Avon 
resolved an FCPA enforcement action for $135 million in aggregate DOJ
and SEC settlement amounts, but disclosed approximately $550 million in 
pre-enforcement professional fees and expenses (a 2.5:1 ratio compared to 
                                                                                                                         
217 Ceresney, supra note 77 (“The Commission launched its formal cooperation program a little 
more five years ago, and . . . it has been a great success overall. Even before that . . . the SEC was 
rewarding cooperation in FCPA matters, and it has continued to do so under the more formal program.”).
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the settlement amount).218 Likewise, Bruker Corp. resolved an FCPA 
enforcement action for $2.2 million, but disclosed approximately $22 
million in pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses (a 10:1 
ratio).219 Perhaps most eye-popping, Hyperdynamics resolved an FCPA 
enforcement action for $75,000, but disclosed approximately $12.7 million 
in pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses (a 170:1 ratio).220
Even if the pilot program was binding on the DOJ, which it is not, the 
fact is the pilot program only addresses bucket two (settlement amount) and 
does not address pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses—
the biggest financial hit to a business organization subject to FCPA scrutiny. 
Sure, consistent with Assistant Attorney General Caldwell’s April 2015 
speech that the DOJ “do[es] not expect companies to aimlessly boil the 
ocean” in FCPA investigations,221 the pilot program does contain the 
following footnote:
[A]bsent facts to suggest a more widespread problem, 
evidence of criminality in one country, without more, would 
not lead to an expectation that an investigation would need to 
extend to other countries.222
Yet here again, the DOJ has been highlighting the excesses of FCPA 
internal investigations (and pointing the finger at FCPA Inc. and not itself 
as the root cause) for years prior to the pilot program with no observable 
impact. For instance, in 2013 then-DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Charles Duross 
called out FCPA Inc. at an American Bar Association event. 
Duross suggested that other company lawyers are seeking to 
over do it through a global search of operations for FCPA 
issues. He discussed a case in which a company and its 
professional advisors came to a meeting with a global search 
plan and he said ‘no, no, no, that is not what I want.’ [Duross]
indicated that the lawyers and other professional advisors in 
                                                                                                                         
218 Mike Koehler, Issues to Consider from the Avon Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 
22, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues-to-consider-from-the-avon-enforcement-action/.
219 See Bruker Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2015) (“In the fiscal years ended 
December 31, 2014, 2013 and 2012, $3.2 million, $6.1 million and $11.1 million, respectively, was 
recorded for legal and other professional services incurred related to the internal investigation of these 
matters.”).
220 See Hyperdynamics Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 22, 2016) (“We have been subject 
to a Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission FCPA investigation into how we 
obtained or retained the Concession and spent approximately $12.8 million in legal fees in working with 
the US Government.”).
221 Caldwell, supra note 210.
222 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE 6 n.5 (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/838416/download.
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the room ‘looked unhappy,’ but the general counsel of the 
company was happy.223
In addition to not meaningfully addressing bucket one, pre-enforcement 
action professional fees and expenses, the pilot program also does not 
meaningfully address bucket three, post-enforcement action professional 
fees and expenses. Sure, the pilot program does state, consistent with the 
DOJ’s prior rhetoric on the issue, that voluntary disclosure, cooperation and 
remediation “generally should not require appointment of a monitor.”224 But 
even FCPA enforcement actions resolved without a monitor typically 
require reporting obligations by the business organization to the enforcement 
agencies, and in some cases, “enhanced compliance obligations” complete 
with audits.225 While bucket three is the smallest of the “three buckets” of 
financial exposure, post-enforcement action professional fees and expenses, 
even in garden-variety FCPA corporate enforcement actions, often exceed 
millions of dollars per year for the one to three years of the requirements.
The corporate community needs to fully understand and appreciate that 
the pilot program only addresses a relatively minor component of the overall 
financial consequences that typically result from FCPA scrutiny and 
enforcement. Related to this key point is the fact that a company (particularly 
an issuer) subject to FCPA scrutiny and enforcement will often also 
experience several other negative financial consequences above and beyond 
the “three buckets” of financial exposure. Such financial consequences often 
include a drop in market capitalization, an increase in the cost of capital, a 
negative impact on merger and acquisition activity, lost or delayed business 
opportunities, and shareholder litigation. In certain cases, these other 
negative financial consequences can far exceed even the “three buckets” of 
financial exposure discussed above.
In short, corporate leaders need to fully understand and appreciate (in 
addition to the specific topics discussed above) that a voluntary disclosure 
of potential FCPA violations is going to set into motion a wide-ranging 
sequence of events that will be far costlier to the company than any marginal 
                                                                                                                         
223 Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:05 AM), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-93/.
224 THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND 
GUIDANCE, supra note 226.
225 See generally Nathaniel Edmonds, Morgan Heavener & Ian Herbert, DOJ’s FCPA Enforcement 
Plan Highlights the Need for Robust Anti-Corruption Compliance Programs, PAUL HASTINGS LLP (April 
2016), https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/stay-current-doj-39-s-fcpa-
enforcement-plan-highlights-the-need-for-robust-anti-corruption-compliance-programs.pdf (explaining 
enhanced compliance obligations); Gary DiBianco & Bernd R. Mayer, A Window to the U.S. –
Developments in Health Care and Life Sciences Investigations, Enforcement and Litigation, and the 
Effects on Transactions 39, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (May 7, 2013), 
https://files.skadden.com/eVites%2FFRA%2FWindowtotheUS_ DevelopmentsinHealthcare_PPT
_2.PDF (explaining FCPA “enhanced compliance obligations in pharma and device settlements”).
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benefit obtained through the pilot program’s non-binding promise of a 
reduced settlement amount.226
No doubt there are some who are likely to respond that if a business 
organization does not voluntarily disclose FCPA violations, it is likely that 
the enforcement agencies will independently find out about the violations,
and when this happens the company is going to experience the same negative 
financial consequences highlighted above plus, because of the lack of 
voluntary disclosure, a larger settlement amount. However, this line of 
reasoning represents pure speculation.227
Notwithstanding the many shortcomings in the pilot program, going 
forward there no doubt will be companies (perhaps persuaded by FCPA 
counsel eying lucrative billings that flow from voluntary disclosures) that 
choose to voluntarily disclose FCPA issues in the hopes of being “rewarded” 
under the pilot program. Certain commentators are likely to then proclaim 
the pilot program a success. However, this line of reasoning completely 
misses the point that business organizations were often voluntarily 
disclosing prior to the pilot program. 
Rather, the key issue to track is whether the pilot program is motivating 
voluntary disclosure of potential FCPA violations that did not occur prior to 
the pilot program. It will be impossible to empirically measure this issue. 
Likewise, it will be difficult (if not impossible) to assess whether the DOJ is 
acting consistent with the pilot program for the reasons discussed above 
regarding how the final sentencing guidelines amount is the product of, and 
contingent upon, several less-than-transparent discretionary calls made by 
the DOJ earlier in the sentencing guidelines equation.
The Pilot Program Falls Short of Best Achieving Laudable Goals
The deep gorge in the FCPA enforcement landscape depicted above is a 
concerning policy issue and it is a laudable goal of the pilot program to 
encourage “companies to disclose FCPA misconduct to permit the 
prosecution of individuals whose criminal wrongdoing might otherwise 
never be uncovered by or disclosed to law enforcement.”228 However, the 
                                                                                                                         
226 Recall that under the pilot program, even if a company does not voluntarily disclose it may 
receive a 25% credit off the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines if it cooperate and remediates. 
Mike Koehler, The Numbers Prove that the DOJ’s FCPA Pilot Program is Really Nothing New, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Apr. 12, 2016, 2:04 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-numbers-prove-that-the-dojs-fcpa-
pilot-program-is-really-nothing-new/.
227 The following is anecdotal and not offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted. The 
author has been actively involved in the FCPA space for approximately 15 years both as a lawyer in 
private practice who conducted FCPA internal investigations around the world and in other professional 
capacities. To the author’s knowledge, never once did the DOJ independently find out about the 
underlying conduct and in speaking to other FCPA practitioners about this precise topic, it has never 
happened to their clients either.
228 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE 9 (Apr. 5 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/838386/download.
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pilot program falls short of best bridging this gorge compared to other 
alternatives previously advanced.
Indeed, a supreme irony of the pilot program was that it bore the 
signature of Andrew Weissmann, Chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section. Prior to 
Weissmann assuming this position in January 2015, he was a vocal critic of 
various aspects of the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program, as well as 
corporate criminal liability principles generally. Among other things, 
Weissmann advocated for an FCPA compliance defense and stated:
The FCPA should incentivize the company to establish 
compliance systems that will actively discourage and detect 
bribery, but should also permit companies that maintain such 
effective systems to avail themselves of an affirmative defense 
to charges of FCPA violations. This is so because in such 
countries even if companies have strong compliance systems 
in place, a third-party vendor or errant employee may be 
tempted to engage in acts that violate the business’s explicit 
anti-bribery policies. It is unfair to hold a business criminally 
liable for behavior that was neither sanctioned by or known to 
the business.229
According to Weissmann, an FCPA compliance defense, as well as the
other FCPA reforms he advocated, were “best suited for Congressional 
action.”230 In other words, Weissmann did not believe that changes to DOJ 
policy, which is all the pilot program represented, were enough.
Prior to the pilot program, in Fall 2015 the DOJ announced the 
appointment of a compliance counsel to assist DOJ prosecutors in evaluating 
corporate compliance programs at the time of improper conduct to determine 
if fine reductions are warranted.231 Weissmann was widely viewed as being 
the architect of this position and stated that a motivation in creating the 
position was to “empower a robust compliance function within 
organizations.”232 Asked what he “hope[d] to accomplish in general and 
specifically to assist the compliance professional,” Weissmann responded: 
“I hope that, in seeing how seriously the Department of Justice takes 
compliance, we will strengthen the voice of the compliance professionals 
                                                                                                                         
229 ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, RESTORING BALANCE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 6–7 (Oct. 2010), 
http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/digital_assets/f07abd4c-cf8b-44dd-8151-64cc73cfd56e/76-2-
Chamber_Foreign_Corrupt_Practices_Book_s_Book.pdf.
230 Id.
231 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW COMPLIANCE COUNSEL EXPERT RETAINED BY THE DOJ FRAUD 
SECTION, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download.
232 Laura Jacobus, DOJ’s Andrew Weissmann and Hui Chen Talk Corporate Compliance in 
Exclusive Interview, ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (Feb. 2, 2016, 8:47), 
https://www.ethics.org/blogs/laura-jacobus/2016/02/01/doj-interview.
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and help them get a stronger seat at the table as a key stakeholder in how 
businesses are run.”233
Whether it’s the pilot program’s stated goal to “encourage companies to 
implement strong anti-corruption compliance programs to prevent and 
detect FCPA violations” or to best “empower a robust compliance function 
within organizations” and best “strengthen the voice of the compliance 
professional [to] help them get a strong seat at the table,”234 Weissmann 
should have listened to his former self because his former self seemed to 
recognize that the DOJ’s recent announcements were not the best answer to 
accomplish its stated goals.
Like several former high-ranking DOJ officials and others, this author 
has long argued that an FCPA compliance defense (an actual statutory 
amendment, not merely a change in DOJ internal policy) can best allow the 
FCPA enforcement agencies to accomplish their stated objectives. The 2012 
article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense” 
stated:
An FCPA compliance defense will better facilitate the DOJ’s 
prosecution of culpable individuals and advance the objectives 
of its FCPA enforcement program. At present, business 
organizations that learn through internal reporting 
mechanisms of rogue employee conduct implicating the FCPA 
are often hesitant to report such conduct to the enforcement 
authorities. In such situations, business organizations are 
rightfully diffident to submit to the DOJ’s opaque, 
inconsistent, and unpredictable decision-making process and 
are rightfully concerned that its pre-existing FCPA 
compliance policies and procedures and its good faith 
compliance efforts will not be properly recognized. The end 
result is that the DOJ often does not become aware of 
individuals who make improper payments in violation of the 
FCPA and the individuals are thus not held legally accountable 
for their actions. An FCPA compliance defense surely will not 
cause every business organization that learns of rogue 
employee conduct to disclose such conduct to the enforcement 
agencies. However, it is reasonable to conclude that an FCPA 
compliance defense will cause more organizations with robust 
FCPA compliance policies and procedures to disclose rogue 
employee conduct to the enforcement agencies. Thus, an 
FCPA compliance defense can better facilitate DOJ 
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prosecution of culpable individuals and increase the deterrent 
effect of FCPA enforcement actions.235
Another policy objective that a compliance defense can better achieve 
compared to the pilot program is increasing “soft enforcement” of the FCPA. 
In other words, a compliance defense can best incentivize business 
organizations to implement more robust FCPA policies and procedures, and 
more robust policies and procedures can reduce instances of improper 
conduct and thereby advance the FCPA’s objectives. Critics of an FCPA 
compliance defense have ignored its potential “soft enforcement” impact 
focusing instead on “hard enforcement” issues, including assertions that the
defense would prove to be unworkable in a contested proceeding or lack 
practical value given that business organizations tend not to put the FCPA 
enforcement agencies to their burdens of proof.236
Such criticisms of a compliance defense miss the point. In passing the 
FCPA, Congress anticipated that the “criminalization of foreign corporate 
bribery will to a significant extent act as a self-enforcing preventative 
mechanism.”237 Likewise, since the FCPA’s earliest days the DOJ has 
recognized that the “most efficient means of implementing the FCPA is 
voluntary compliance by the American business community.”238 Indeed, 
Weissmann himself has previously stated that FCPA reform should best 
motivate compliance “on a daily basis” and “regardless of what the DOJ is 
doing.”239
This is precisely what a compliance defense can better accomplish 
compared to the pilot program. To best conceptualize this issue, consider 
two scenarios: 
x Scenario A – The existing landscape for at least the past 
decade with the underlined language representing the recent 
pilot program and DOJ compliance counsel position.
x Scenario B – The landscape if the FCPA were amended to 
include a compliance defense.
Ask yourself under which scenario is a compliance officer most likely 
to receive the budget and internal support to adopt best-in-class FCPA 
compliance policies? 
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Scenario A
Compliance Officer: Boss, I need more money and resources to devote 
to FCPA compliance.
Executive: Why?
Compliance Officer: Well, boss, if anything ever happens within our 
business organization, an effective FCPA compliance program can lessen 
the impact of our legal liability.
Executive: What do you mean?
Compliance Officer: Well, the money we spend on FCPA compliance 
will not eliminate our legal exposure, but the DOJ and SEC have said that 
the existence of an effective compliance program may perhaps lower our 
criminal or civil fine or penalty amount and perhaps even persuade an 
enforcement attorney to go lightly on us in case our compliance program is 
ever circumvented by an employee. Indeed, the DOJ recently announced in 
non-binding guidance that it may offer us a criminal fine reduction to the 
extent we voluntarily disclose the conduct, cooperate with the enforcement 
agencies, and remediate. Moreover, the DOJ recently announced that it has 
a compliance consultant on its staff who is going to assist DOJ prosecutors 
in evaluating our compliance program at the time of the improper conduct 
to see if we should include qualify for a fine reduction.
Scenario B
Compliance Officer: Boss, I need more money and resources to devote 
to FCPA compliance.
Executive: Why?
Compliance Officer: Well, boss, an effective FCPA compliance 
program can reduce our legal exposure as a matter of law.
Executive:  What do you mean?
Compliance Officer: Well, the money we spend on investing in FCPA 
best practices will be relevant as a matter of law. In other words, if we make 
good faith efforts to comply with the FCPA when doing business in the 
international marketplace, we will not face any legal exposure when a non-
executive employee or agent acts contrary to our compliance policies and/or 
circumvents our policies.
Most compliance professionals are likely to answer the above question 
by saying that Scenario B will best allow the compliance officer to receive 
the budget and support needed to most effectively do his/her job.240
An FCPA compliance defense will not magically result in 100% best-
in-class FCPA compliance in all business organizations or cause all business 
                                                                                                                         
240 For instance, the author runs the FCPA Institute (a two-day active learning experience for FCPA 
professionals such as in-house counsel and compliance professionals from leading companies, lawyers 
in private practice, as well as other compliance and business professionals) and every time the above 
scenario has been used, Scenario B has been the unanimous answer.
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organizations to disclose all FCPA violations. However, the DOJ 
announcement of a pilot program in 2016 and prior to that a compliance 
counsel position were not the best answers if the DOJ’s true goals are to 
encourage “companies to disclose FCPA misconduct to permit the 
prosecution of individuals whose criminal wrongdoing might otherwise 
never be uncovered by or disclosed to law enforcement” and to best 
“empower a robust compliance function within organizations” and best 
“strengthen the voice of the compliance professional [to] help them get a 
strong seat at the table.”
The Pilot Program in Practice
Since the release of the pilot program in April 2016 through the end of 
2016, the DOJ has self-identified five corporate matters resolved through so-
called declinations consistent with the pilot program: Nortek, Akamai 
Technologies, Johnson Controls, HMT LLC, and NCH Corp.241
Nevertheless, these instances raise more questions than answers concerning 
the pilot program.
For starters, none of the five instances were “pure” voluntary disclosures 
“pursuant” to the pilot program. In other words, all of the companies 
disclosed and were under FCPA scrutiny prior to April 2016. Moreover, 
three of the instances (Nortek, Akamai, and Johnson Controls) merely 
reference “possible” FCPA violations and the salient question needs to be 
asked: just what viable criminal charges did the DOJ actually decline?242
Based on the information in the public domain (the SEC’s related civil 
administrative actions against the companies) the answer appears to be none,
and the three instances would appear to be attempts by the DOJ to market 
its nascent pilot program.243
The other two instances the DOJ self-identified as being resolved 
through so-called declinations consistent with the pilot program were HMT 
and NCH and these matters were materially different than the prior three 
examples in at least three respects.
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First and most important is that HMT and NCH paid money “pursuant 
to” declination letters whereas Nortek, Akamai Technologies, and Johnson 
Controls did not. Specifically, HMT agreed to disgorge approximately $2.7 
million244 and NCH agreed to disgorge approximately $335,000.245 Second, 
the prior three examples occurred against the backdrop of SEC enforcement 
actions against the issuer companies.  However, HMT and NCH were both 
private business organizations not subject to SEC jurisdiction and thus the 
only information in the public domain is the information in the DOJ’s letters. 
Perhaps because of this difference, the HMT and NCH letters were 
comparatively more substantive than the prior three examples. Third, and 
presumably the reason for the first difference noted above, the prior three 
examples involved “possible” FCPA violations that left significant open 
questions about whether any actual viable FCPA criminal violations were 
actually declined. However, the HMT and NCH letters (certain statute of 
limitations issues aside) seemingly articulate viable FCPA violations against 
the companies based on the DOJ’s current enforcement theories.
Despite this material difference, the HMT and NCH “declination with
disgorgement” letters were nevertheless concerning because the DOJ 
literally invented a new way to enforce the FCPA. In terms of historical 
background, from 1977 to 2004 there were only two ways in which the DOJ 
resolved alleged instances of corporate FCPA scrutiny: it either charged the 
company or it did not charge the company. In late 2004 and thereafter, the 
DOJ brought non-prosecution agreements and deferred prosecution 
agreements, neither of which are mentioned in the FCPA, to the FCPA 
context. In April 2016, with release of the pilot program, the DOJ formally 
unveiled so-called “declinations” and in September 2016 the DOJ unveiled 
in the HMT and NCH matters declinations with disgorgement. In many 
respects, DOJ enforcement of the FCPA has strayed from traditional law 
enforcement to something akin to a buffet line.
The HMT and NCH matters are all the more concerning because the 
FCPA explicitly provides the DOJ a non-criminal option for enforcing the 
FCPA against non-issuer companies such as HMT and NCH. For instance, 
both the 78dd-2 prong of the FCPA (applicable to “domestic concerns”—
FCPA-speak for all forms of U.S. business organizations not issuers and 
U.S. nationals) and the 78dd-3 prong of the FCPA (applicable to “persons 
other than issuers or domestic concerns”—FCPA-speak for foreign 
companies not issuers and foreign nationals) specifically authorize the DOJ 
to bring civil actions for FCPA violations.
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Section 78dd-2(d) under the heading “Injunctive Relief” specifically 
states in pertinent part:
(1) When it appears to the Attorney General that any domestic 
concern to which this section applies, or officer, director, 
employee, agent, or stockholder thereof, is engaged, or about 
to engage, in any act or practice constituting a violation of 
subsection (a) or (i) of this section, the Attorney General may, 
in his discretion, bring a civil action in an appropriate district 
court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice, and 
upon a proper showing, a permanent injunction or a temporary 
restraining order shall be granted without bond. . . . All process 
in any such case may be served in the judicial district in which 
such person resides or may be found. The Attorney General 
may make such rules relating to civil investigations as may be 
necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this 
subsection.246
Between 1991 and 2001, the DOJ resolved four corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions consistent with this express statutory authority.247
While four enforcement actions over a 10-year period may not sound like 
many, there were only eleven DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
between 1991 and 2001.248 Thus, the four enforcement actions comprised 
36% of all DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions during this time frame. 
When asked why the DOJ has stopped civilly enforcing the FCPA, the 
DOJ’s press office simply responded: “We decline to comment. Thank 
you.”249 Among the many other policy concerns raised by the DOJ’s pilot 
program discussed above, the HMT and NCH “declinations with 
disgorgement” present the additional issue that perhaps instead of creating 
new ways to enforce the FCPA not even mentioned in the statute, the DOJ 
should enforce the FCPA in ways expressly authorized by Congress.
As mentioned above, it is impossible to empirically measure various 
aspects of the pilot program. However, it is possible to assess whether a 
“main goal” of the pilot program is working, and at present, the undeniable 
answer is that the pilot program is currently failing. In the pilot program, the 
DOJ clearly stated that a “main goal” of the program is to use voluntarily 
disclosures to learn about information that will allow it to prosecute 
individuals. Specifically, the pilot program states: “[T]his pilot program is 
intended to encourage companies to disclose FCPA misconduct to permit 
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the prosecution of individuals whose criminal wrongdoing might otherwise 
never be uncovered by or disclosed to law enforcement.”250
At the DOJ’s April 2016 Pilot Program press conference, Assistant 
Attorney General Leslie Caldwell stated that the goal of the “pilot program” 
is to “encourage self-reporting” because companies have information about 
individuals who have violated the FCPA and have documents relevant to 
FCPA violations.  According to Caldwell, the goal of the program is to 
“encourage” companies to give the DOJ this information. In subsequent 
public comments, Caldwell stated: 
[The] idea of the Pilot Program, in part, is get the company to 
self-report by giving it some incentives so that when it comes 
in and self-reports, it will give us the information that it has . . 
. that will in turn enable us to prosecute individuals because 
we recognize that prosecution of individuals is the biggest 
deterrent . . . to corporate wrongdoing, and criminal 
wrongdoing . . . that is really one of the main goals of the Pilot 
Program.251
Likewise, Caldwell stated:
We want that information because we want to be able to make 
cases against those individuals, but we don’t have that 
evidence . . . [the idea of the pilot program] is to get that 
information that we know is out there about culpable 
individuals so that we can make the cases against culpable 
individuals. Companies can’t go to jail. Individuals can . . . and 
the biggest deterrent to wrongdoing is prosecuting 
individuals.252
Measuring this “main goal” is fairly easy by comparing the corporate 
resolutions that the DOJ has self-identified as being resolved consistent with 
the pilot program and then seeing whether there have been any individual 
prosecutions related to those matters. As highlighted above, the DOJ has
self-identified five corporate matters as being resolved consistent with the 
pilot program (Nortek, Akamai Technologies, Johnson Controls, HMT LLC,
and NCH Corp) and none of these matters have involved, at least yet, 
prosecution of individuals. Thus, measured against the DOJ’s own “main 
goal” of its pilot program, the program is currently failing.
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CONCLUSION
The year 2016 was certainly a record-breaking year for FCPA 
enforcement and it is hoped that this article has highlighted various 
quantitative and qualitative issues of value to anyone seeking to elevate their 
FCPA knowledge. Yet, as the FCPA approaches its 40th anniversary, many 
legal and policy issues surround FCPA enforcement that need to be 
addressed if the FCPA is to best achieve its laudable goals of reducing 
bribery in ways consistent with the rule of law.
